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Abstract
This dissertation explores the domestic consequences of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) program lending. It argues that when governments implement austerity
reforms attached to IMF loans it increases human rights violations and violence in
borrower governments. A new measure of IMF compliance is developed and used to
explore the consequences of IMF lending in the 21st century. Past research exploring
IMF lending consequences has assumed compliance away. While IMF program lending
is largely seen as a failure there is significant debate about the causes of failure. Human
rights scholars have argued that austerity policies impose significant hardships on citizens
in borrower governments. International organization scholars and political economists
have pointed to low compliance with reforms as a cause of negative outcomes. While
both of these literatures use compliance as the causal mechanism neither directly tests
whether reforms are being met. Compliance with IMF austerity is measured for all 93
IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2015. Empirical models are used to test whether IMF
compliance leads to: increased government violations of collective labor rights, increased
violent anti-government protests, and increased repression of physical integrity rights. I
find that as compliance with IMF austerity increases labor rights respect declines, violent
protests increase, and repression increases. While compliance on average is low, the
findings here suggest that if governments implemented all of the reforms that the IMF
asks for, global labor rights violation, domestic violence, and repression would
significantly increase across the globe.
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Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been criticized for undermining
human rights and contributing to political instability. Austerity policies, which the IMF
requires in exchange for loans, are increasingly seen as unsuitable to citizens and policy
makers. IMF programs have a poor track record of promoting economic growth and have
been criticized for increasing economic rights violations. These relationships have
become painfully clear in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis as several
developed countries (such as Portugal, Ireland, and Greece) were forced to take out IMF
loans. Leaders in all three countries protested that IMF austerity was too harsh, harmed
citizens, and undermined political stability. These protests are the same that developing
countries have been making for decades. The case of Greece has proved particularly
informative.
Greece took out an IMF loan in 2010 to address growing debt and negative
economic growth. Far from generating growth, Greece has since negotiated multiple IMF
loans and been under program lending for 8 consecutive years. Greece nearly exited the
European Union in its attempt to renegotiate the economic reforms attached to these
loans. These reforms were extremely unpopular at home. Greek labor unions decried that
IMF austerity was an attack on workers and labor rights. Teachers and students rallied
against cuts to education spending. Farmers protested cuts to farming subsidies and tax
hikes. Anarchists, communists, and other leftist groups organized against austerity as a
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reform strategy. These groups collectively engaged in 149 violent and non-violent
protests between 2010 and 2015.
Hundreds of thousands of citizens repeatedly took to the streets expressing
grievances with the economic reforms that the IMF had asked for and the government
agreed to. Many of these protests turned violent, leading to property damage,
confrontations with police, and death. Media images capturing these protests look more
like war zones than the capital of a developed OECD country. Police have responded by
using tear gas and beatings to repress violent and non-violent protesters alike.
In 2015, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, the United Nations Independent Expert on
foreign debt and human rights, urged International Financial Institutions to reconsider the
effect of lending reforms on human rights. Speaking of IMF austerity in Greece,
Bohoslavsky said:
“The harsh conditionalities of the Greek adjustment programme
have resulted in severe cut-backs in social spending, health care and
education, raising concerns about the ability of the Greek government to
ensure basic economic and social rights.” 1
“[F]urther adjustment policies should respect the human rights
obligations that are binding not only for the Government of Greece, but as
well for the creditor countries and lending institutions. There is real legal
risk that some of the harsh austerity measures could be incompatible with
European and international human rights law.” 2
This critique of IMF austerity is quite severe. In the first quote, Bohoslavsky
argues that the implementation of IMF austerity has undermined government respect for
even the most basic economic and social rights. If a developed country under IMF
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United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2015

2

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2015a
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austerity cannot protect economic and social rights then there is little hope for developing
countries under similar lending agreements. The second quote is even more pointed as he
argues that IMF austerity may be incompatible with international human rights law. This
has been echoed by scholars who argue that austerity policies are fundamentally
incompatible with human rights protections. 3 This suggests that governments which
implement austerity may violate international human rights law in the process.
The crisis exposed deep rooted cleavages among EU members which undermined
the unified European experiment that the EU represents. Other EU members and their
citizens blamed Greece. A Pew Global report found that citizens in EU member countries
listed Greeks as the “laziest and most incompetent in the EU”, while Greeks saw
themselves as the most hardworking. 4 Media coverage of Greece in the United Kingdom
and Germany has had strong anti-Greek biases.5 Rather than harsh austerity, these
critiques saw the Greek government as unwilling to make necessary economic reforms.
Divides in the Eurozone over bailouts have activated strong nationalist sentiments and
polarization within countries. 6 That so many see Greeks as lazy ignores the human
suffering that often accompanies austerity. As a result, anti-Greek sentiment threatens to
destroy the entire EU project.
Criticisms of this type have been levied against IMF borrowers in the past.
Complaints that austerity is too harsh and will cause serious societal problems are often
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Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Elson and Balakrishnan 2011; Blanton and Peksen 2016
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Thompson 2012
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Hellwig 2011; Bechtel, Hainmueller, and Margalit 2014
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met with deft indifference from the IMF and Western states. Egypt serves as one
example. In 1977, President Anwar Sadat agreed to remove subsidies on gas, sugar, rice,
and bread. He had spent years arguing that the removal of these subsidies would generate
widespread backlash, but the IMF insisted. The removal of these subsidies immediately
triggered the “bread riots”, which were some of the worst riots in Egyptian history, and
which threatened to engulf the country in civil conflict. 7 Sadat came to be seen as a leader
who had sold out to the West. This culminated in his assassination in 1981 by Islamic
extremists. Venezuela under President Carlos Andres Perez is another example. Perez, a
socialist who campaigned on an anti-austerity platform, signed up for an IMF loan in
1989. This resulted in substantial losses in credibility and many cite this as paving the
way for Hugo Chavez’s rise to power. Finally, in 2001 the IMF cut off Argentina’s
access to lending as it alleged that the government of Fernando de la Rua (1999-2001)
had failed to implement sufficient reforms. Despite this critique, the reforms that were
enacted had caused widespread riots and chaos eventually forcing Rua and three
subsequent presidents from office.
Greek complaints against austerity differ in that they come from one of seven
developed countries which have borrowed from the IMF in the 21 st century. In Ireland
and Portugal austerity caused hundreds of thousands to take to the street. Citizens
complained that austerity had forced many into poverty and unemployment. Protests
resulted in violent clashes with police. 8 But, Ireland and Portugal differ from Greece

7

Hillal Dessouki 1981
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Information about protests and police clashes in Ireland and Portugal is taken from the Mass Mobilization
protest dataset.
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because they spent much less time under IMF lending and each only took out a single
loan (both took out an Extended Fund Facility which lasted approximately four years).9
Had they stayed under longer, violence likely would have continued.
Greece was not as fortunate and has taken out multiple loans from the IMF since
2010. The Syrian civil war also led to large inflows of refugees to Greece, which
overwhelmed state capacity. Nationalist sentiment increased as Greeks saw themselves as
isolated and condemned by other EU countries. Anti-refugee violence surged as Greeks
complained that the government was spending money on refugees while forcing Greeks
into poverty.10 EU countries provided little in the way of refugee funding while
condemning the Greek government for failing to implement austerity reforms. In many
ways, Greece under IMF lending was forced to balance weak state capacity with
increasing social conflict based on societal cleavages, while still garnering little sympathy
from the IMF and Western states.
Under IMF lending, Greece has seen its labor rights decline, violent protests
increase, and repression of citizens increases. This experience matches those in Egypt,
Venezuela, and Argentina under IMF lending. This dissertation explores how IMF
austerity impacts labor rights, violent protest, and repression. Before discussing these
relationships, it is necessary to outline what the International Monetary Fund, what
austerity is, and why compliance with IMF lending is important for testing whether these
relationships are anecdotal or evidence of something systematic.

9

This data comes from the SCIP dataset developed by the author.
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International Monetary Fund Austerity
The IMF was formed during WWII as an international organization whose aim
was to address balance of payment problems and facilitate a more open international
economic system. Today, nearly every country in the world is a member of the IMF.
Each member country contributes a portion of currency on reserve, which helps fund IMF
activities. The amount of currency on reserve determines voting power as well as the
amount that a country is eligible to borrow. The United States, United Kingdom, Japan,
Germany, and France contribute the largest shares and control over a third of the voting
power in the IMF. However, the overwhelming majority of loans are made to developing
countries. When a member country faces an economic crisis, the IMF can act as a lender
of last resort.
In order to receive a loan, the IMF asks for a set of initial reforms (prior actions).
Requesting initial reforms helps screen out countries that are unlikely to comply with
reforms. Once these initial reforms have been implemented, the IMF officially agrees to
lend that country money. A loan is given in tranches, each of which includes a set of
conditions which must be enacted in order for the money to continue to be disbursed.
IMF conditionality is meant to ensure that reform takes place and to prevent the IMF
from simply subsidizing the policies which led to economic trouble in the first place.
Programs are designed by the IMF staff along with the Finance Minister and the
executive branch in recipient countries. As long as a country has implemented the
necessary conditions, then the loan continues to be disbursed.

6

IMF programs are aimed at economic reform as well as ensuring that loans are
repaid. Each loan has a number of policies which are evaluated by the IMF Executive
Board: ranging from as few as 1 condition (Macedonia in 2011 and 2012) to as many as
32211 (Jamaica in 2015). These policies cover a range of different areas. Some policies
are aimed at fiscal reform, trade, and finance while others cover labor markets, social
spending, and transparency. Over time, the IMF has increased the scope of policies
covered by loans leading to mission creep. 12 Critics often argue that the IMF does not
have the expertise to recommend reforms outside of the traditional balance of payment
issues for which it was founded.
The IMF does not exist simply as a technocratic organization promoting the best
economic reforms for each case. IMF programs are subject to politics from both
international and domestic actors. While the IMF almost always get repaid 13, compliance
with reforms is low. 14 This has led many to explore the role of politics in IMF lending.
IMF member states may pressure the IMF to help allies or strategically important
countries. Many voting decisions within the IMF require an 85% majority. The United
States controls over 16% of the voting power giving it a veto over important lending
decisions. The United States has used this influence to alter lending decisions when it
suits their interests.15 In these cases, countries may have an easier time gaining, or may

11

This does not refer to 322 unique conditions. Rather it is the number of policies which have been
evaluated by the Executive Board, with some policies being evaluated more than once.
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Kentilikelenis, King, and Stubbs 2016
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Dreher 2009
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Bird and Willett 2004; Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009; Bas and Stone 2014
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Stone 2004, 2008, 2011; Dreher et al. 2015
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continue receiving, a loan despite non-compliance with IMF conditionality. The IMF also
seems unwilling to cut off loans to countries which fail to implement reforms. 16 This
causes countries to become dependent on IMF loans and to expect these loans whenever
they face trouble. 17
Domestically, leaders bargain with the IMF to limit policies which may be
unpopular.18 For example, if a leader expects resistance from unions, then they negotiate
for fewer labor conditions. 19 Even with negotiations, leaders are still stuck with austerity
reforms which are likely to harm citizens, and not all leaders oppose such reforms.
Leaders may use IMF programs to bypass domestic political and institutional
constraints.20 This helps elites in a country push through reforms which otherwise might
have failed. Blanton et al. (2015; 2015a) argue that during times of economic crisis, the
power of labor is weak relative to capital and this allows leaders to enact reforms which
further weaken labor. These can be seen as shortcomings of the IMF as an International
Organization. Lending is biased by politics, poor lending choices, and leaders who use
the IMF as cover.
In light of evidence that IMF programs often fail to promote growth 21, it is not
surprising that there are also negative socio-economic consequences. Recent evidence
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Vreeland 2006

17

Noy 2008; Dreher 2009

18

Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012

19

Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012

20

Smith and Vreeland 2006

21

For an overview of this literature see Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Dreher 2006, 2009; Bas and Stone
2014 Moosa 2018.
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reaffirms the negative relationship between IMF programs and economic rights. 22 Yet
much of this literature uses data that is nearly two decades old. Abouharb and Cingranelli
(2007) show a negative relationship between both IMF and World Bank programs and
labor rights, economic rights, peace, and respect for physical integrity rights between
1981 and 2003. Yet, the IMF has undergone significant reforms in the 21 st century. The
IMF has streamlined conditionality23, increased its work with domestic civil society
groups24 and made renewed efforts to minimize the negative consequence of IMF
programs on society in general. 25 New lending instruments aimed at reducing poverty and
protecting social welfare spending floors have also been developed in the 21 st century.
This presents a wrinkle to the prevailing literature. First, it begs the question of
whether the negative outcomes of IMF programs, such poor growth or human rights
violations, are the result of compliance with IMF austerity or lack of compliance. The
debate between various critics is in many ways uninformed. While the structural reforms
and austerity promoted by the IMF are generally understood, there is little evidence of
compliance that is not anecdotal. 26 There is almost no systematic evaluation of how
compliance affects outcomes of interest. Advocates of austerity hold faith-like belief that
the market is the protector of freedom; critics of austerity believe it is its greatest threat.

22

see Blanton, Blanton, and Peksen 2015
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IMF 2007, 2009

24 IMF
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Blanchard, Jaumotte, and Loungani 2013

26

Vreeland 2006
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The next section outlines two economic recovery strategies: stimulus spending
and austerity. The counterfactual for IMF austerity is what would have happened had a
country chosen an alternative set of reforms such as stimulus spending or some
combination of the two (i.e. less austerity with counter-cyclical spending). The role of the
IMF in promoting a specific set of reforms is also important. IMF austerity did not
develop out of thin air but was the result of a changing international economic order and
debates regarding economic theory.
Two Theories of Economic Recovery
When countries have economic trouble, their economies may face a sudden
downturn leading to a contraction of the economy, which is defined as a decrease in
Gross Domestic Product. If this contraction lasts for six months it is a recession, if it lasts
for several years it is a depression, which is a form of economic crisis. Economic crises
can be caused by runs on banks, unsustainable debt, inflation, and capital flight. A crisis
may exist in a single country or can affect a set of countries. In some cases economic
crises spread and become a global issue. Most recently, the 2007-2008 global financial
crisis affected nearly every country on the globe many of which have still not recovered.
The panic of 1873, the great depression of 1929, the great stagflation of 1973, and the
Asian crisis of 1997 are other historical instances of large scale financial crises. There are
countless other instances of economic crisis that were regional or specific to a single
country. Governments must decide which set of reforms to enact in order to respond to
the crisis. While there are many reforms that can be enacted, I simplify economic reform
into two strategies. One strategy is to cut spending (austerity) and the other is to increase
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spending (stimulus). Which strategy leaders choose is often a function of both domestic
and international politics.
Economic reform has been a domestic issue for most of human history. After
WWII, the international community created a number of International Organizations
meant to promote economic stability. International Financial Institutions were developed
to help countries facing economic problems and overcome collective action problems
which prevented cooperation between states. International Organizations and
international agreements make protectionism more costly and can help states weather
crisis while avoiding protectionist policies. The IMF, World Bank, and General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) helped fund and co-ordinate economic policy
between and within countries.
When the IMF was created, there was significant debate about what role it would
play and how much funding it would have. John Maynard Keynes, a British economist,
played a prominent role in the creation of the IMF alongside American economist Harry
Dexter White. The IMF was designed as a lender of last resort, but Keynes and White
disagreed on whether the burden of adjustment should fall entirely on debtors (White) or
whether there should be constraints on creditors as well (Keynes). 27 White won out, but
the outcome of this debate had a large impact on how the IMF was designed and funded.
Had Keynes won, the IMF, and the policies it recommends, would look very different
today.
In the years since it was created, the IMF has undergone significant reforms in an
attempt to keep up with the times. IMF lending was originally aimed at Europe in the

27

Buttonwood 2014
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post war era. Over time, lending shifted to developing countries and conditionality
expanded in scope and depth. Reforms to the IMF continue as program lending adapts to
critics who argue the IMF should punish countries which do not impose austerity as well
as critics who argue the IMF focuses too much on creditors rather than the welfare of the
poor.28 The IMF as an institution has increasingly called for austerity, but this is not the
only set of reforms it could advocate. Both stimulus and austerity are outlined below.
In the wake of the Great Depression of 1929, the United States chose to increase
government spending. In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt launched The New Deal,
which constituted a number of federal reforms that pumped money into the economy. The
government wanted to reduce the budget but found that it needed to increase spending in
order to fund economic recovery programs, a practice known commonly as stimulus
spending. Stimulus spending is one strategy that governments have used to boost
economic production. By pumping money into the economy, the government can boost
demand for goods and services. As demand rises, businesses expand to meet new demand
and investors spend money to fund those expansions. As businesses expand, jobs are
created and workers spend their money on goods and services, which in turn creates more
demand. John Maynard Keynes is probably the most well know advocate of stimulus
spending as a response to economic crisis.29 Keynesian economic theory has fallen to the
wayside since the 1970s but remains an important and often misunderstood theory

28

Buttonwood 2014
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Keynes 2016
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today.30 Keynes’ logic justified United States and European Union stimulus packages in
the wake of 2007 and is still advocated by economists like Nobel prize winner Paul
Krugman.31
A second strategy focuses on reducing government spending, which is known as
austerity. Austerity aims to significantly reduce government spending in an effort to
control debt. Debt is seen as the primary impediment to economic growth and
accumulates as a result of excessive government spending. Besides reducing debt,
austerity policies seek to remove government involvement in the economy. 32 By
removing barriers such as tariffs and labor regulations, markets will be free to readjust,
growth rates will increase, and the economy can recover. These reforms create a more
favorable climate for businesses and investors. By liberalizing the economy and reducing
debt, austerity fosters robust economic growth which trickles down to benefit society as a
whole. Reforms are harsh and costly in the short term but in the long run the country sees
growth (often referred to as a J-curve). Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek are two of the
most well-known advocates of what is today termed austerity. 33 In the 1970s, austerity
became the dominant economic recovery strategy promoted by International Financial
Institutions like the IMF as well as powerful world leaders including Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher. These reforms mostly take place in the developing world as

See Krugman 2011 for a discussion of modern interpretations of “The General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money” written by Keynes in 1936.
30

31

Krugman 2014

32

These policies may also be accompanied by increases in taxes

33

Friedman 1990; Hayek 2007, 2014

13

developed countries have largely avoided austerity. 34 In the 21st century, this has changed
as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland, Latvia, Turkey, and Hungary are developed
countries (OECD member states) under IMF lending.
The debate between stimulus and austerity is an important one to the discussion of
IMF lending. Each can be seen as the counterfactual to the other. Empirical work by
economists has found support for both. Each camp argues its case in an almost religious
way. From an economic point of view, this debate has provided two strategies for
promoting economic growth. While economic growth has historically been treated as the
most important measure of economic well-being, it is very limited. Many economists
today argue that human rights35 and other measures of human development like
inequality, poverty, healthcare, and standard of living are more relevant indicators. 36
Austerity has been criticized for undermining human rights in exchange for
unobservable benefits decades in the future. Keynes argued that the “long run is a
misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set
themselves too easy, too useless a task, if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us,
that when the storm is long past, the ocean is flat again.” 37 Keynes was skeptical of
arguments which suggested that in the future the economy would grow. If it did grow,
was this due to austerity? Or do economies naturally recover over time? How much
suffering is it worth in the short run to achieve this aim? Human rights scholars make

34

The United Kingdom IMF loan in 1977 is a notable exception. As are Ireland, Portugal, and Greek IMF
loans in the last ten years.
35

Sen 2000
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See Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010

37

Keynes 2000, p.80
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similar arguments and to countries like Greece that exhibit a downward trend in human
rights under austerity. They argue instead that reforms should ensure that human rights
remain protected. Austerity advocates on the other hand are skeptical that short-run debt
can lead to long-term growth. These scholars argue that countries would have been worse
without IMF lending and negative consequences are either a short-term necessity or that
conditions would have improved if reforms were implemented. 38
Debates over whether IMF austerity harms economic rights, causes violence, and
leads to repression essentially boil down to a question about what the direct effect of
austerity is on these outcomes. IMF compliance is levied by proponents of both stimulus
reform (high compliance) and austerity reform (low compliance) as the causal
explanation that proves their cause. This of course is in large part due to the fact that data
on IMF compliance is largely missing, which makes it difficult to directly test any of
these relationships.
IMF Compliance
Compliance has been at the center of scholarly and policy research on
International Organizations for decades. The question of whether International
Organizations and agreements alter state behavior is not a trivial one or an easy one to
untangle. International Organizations can increase information, serve as signaling
mechanisms, and impose costs for non-compliance.39 All of these should alter state
behavior. On the other hand there is often a compliance deficit as international
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Eriksen and De Soysa 2009
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Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990; Chayes and Chayes 1993, Simmons 2000; Simmons and Hopkins
2005; Konig and Mader 2014
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agreements suffer from agency loss, ineffective monitoring, and non-punishment.40 Some
form of non-compliance is often built into these agreements to make them flexible (for
example escape clauses in trade agreements). 41
Studies of compliance have often been limited by the difficulty of determining
whether state behavior was the result of compliance or whether states would have acted
in the same way regardless.42 One of the limitations of this literature is often a lack of
data on compliance. As a result, empirical studies have often used ratification, the
presence of an institution, or membership in an international agreement as proxies, and
looked at how state behavior changes for those who are bound by these institutions versus
those who are not.43 This has been a particular problem for studying the consequences of
IMF lending given the scarcity of systematic compliance data. 44
For much of the 20th century, information about IMF programs was not public.
Many scholars had to come up with clever ways to measure compliance in light of this
lack of transparency. Recently this has changed: the IMF public database, Monitoring of
Fund Arrangements (MONA) has provided a wealth of new information. However, the
MONA database does not provide this information in a way that is readily available for
quantitative analysis. This dissertation introduce a new disaggregated dataset on IMF
compliance which is suitable for statistical analysis.
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Measuring compliance is not easy. Past studies have looked at a small number of
cases or a single measure of compliance. Hagard (1985) looked at 30 loans made under
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) from 1974-1984, and find that over half were canceled
while the remaining countries complied with very few conditions. Polak (1991) found
that compliance ranged from 40% to 60% for fiscal and credit targets. These studies
alongside a number of others used internal IMF data to evaluate compliance and often
found compliance was low.
A set of widely used measures for evaluating compliance capture whether loan
tranches 45 were disbursed.46 The logic is that, if a country failed to implement the
necessary conditions, the IMF would withhold a tranche and a country could not access
the next portion of the loan. This approach is quite clever and provides a readily available
way to explore compliance. Furthermore, it provides a simple measure of whether a
country has complied that can be used for statistical analysis. However, this measurement
approach has a number of limitations. First, it assumes that if loans are disbursed, a
country complied with the conditions of a loan. However, the literature has shown that
decisions to withhold tranches and punish non-compliance is often a political one, and
punishment is quite rare for allies of powerful member states. 47 Second, a country whose
economy had rebounded would no longer need the loan. By not drawing upon IMF funds
they are coded as non-compliant even if they are still enacting reforms. Some loans are
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also precautionary, with countries failing to ever draw funds because they are not needed.
Alternative measures have included loan suspension, the number of policies in a loan,
and number of years under IMF lending. 48 None of these measures capture what scholars
describe as compliance. At best, these are blunt measures. Scholars have found them
frustratingly limited, but they have been the best available given the scarcity of
information on IMF lending.
This dissertation introduces an aggregate indicator of IMF compliance at the
country-year level. I measure IMF compliance as the percent of IMF conditions evaluated
by the IMF Executive Board that are considered to be met in a country-year. This is
useful in that it provides a single measure of IMF compliance. It allows researchers to
distinguish between low-compliance countries and high compliance countries. Better yet,
it is continuous and provides greater variation in compliance than the dichotomous
measures used in the past. However, this measure also has weaknesses. It assumes that all
IMF conditions are the same despite the fact that some conditions are likely harder to
implement than others. For example, it is harder for a loan recipient to privatize water
than it is to collect monetary statistics, two possible conditions of an IMF loan. The
human rights effects of these two conditions are also likely to be different. This measure
is also not as useful for evaluating theories that rely on the implementation of a specific
type of IMF condition. 80% compliance tells us nothing about which policies are
included in that 80% and which are not. We can say that as the percentage of IMF
compliance rises, the probability that theorized conditions are implemented rises as well.
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This measure is suited to testing theories concerning austerity as a policy package that
contain multiple individual policies. While it is not perfect, it is a significant
improvement over current measures in the literature. This measure also has plenty of
variation between and within countries, which make it useful for empirical tests of
theories in the literature.
Figure 1 (below) shows compliance with IMF conditionality for 93 IMF
borrowers between 2002 and 2015. The average country-year compliance is
approximately 39%. This means that, on average, countries implement fewer than half of
the conditions attached to IMF loans. The standard deviation is about 18%, which
suggests that there is a lot of variation by country. The histogram below reflects this, as
compliance is close to normally distributed. There are a few outliers at high levels of
compliance (above 80%) and at low levels of compliance (at 0%). This data provides
evidence that almost no countries comply with all of the conditions attached to IMF
loans. Almost all countries do comply with some non-trivial percentage of IMF
conditions. So while this data provides reason to be skeptical that compliance leads to
negative outcomes, it also provides evidence that countries are implementing reforms.
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Figure 2 (above) breaks compliance down by the amount of time a country has
spent under IMF lending. There are a few interesting patterns here. First, the average
20

level of compliance is much lower in the first year of IMF lending. This makes sense
because many conditions take time to implement. It also suggests that the level of
compliance that a country is going to choose is much less certain in the first year. Second,
high levels of compliance are rare and occur almost exclusively in the early years (years
2 through 4) of IMF lending. Third, compliance over time, beginning in year 2 through
year 12, is about the same, hovering between 35% and 45%. Most countries implement a
below average number of conditions regardless of how long they have spent under
program lending. This begs the question of whether the large number of IMF conditions
come with the expectation that only around 40% will be met. The tails to these boxes are
also quite large suggesting that there is significant variation between countries that have
spent the same amount of time under IMF lending.
Outline of this project
This project proceeds in five parts. This introduction serves as the first part. It has
introduced a few country examples of IMF austerity and its potential consequences. The
IMF as an International Organization has been discussed, as has the role of IMF austerity
within the broader debate about what generates economic recovery. A new measure of
compliance with IMF lending has been introduced and argued to be suitable for testing
debates in the literature. The rest of this project will use this measure to test whether IMF
austerity is responsible for labor rights violations, violent protest, and repression.
The counterfactual is not what would have happened under stimulus spending, as
there remains no systematic data on austerity versus stimulus spending for a global
sample of countries. If austerity does indeed cause harm then an alternative economic
recovery strategy should be considered. Stimulus spending serves as that alternative.
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However, in this project the counterfactual is lower levels of austerity compliance. What
would have happened to human rights and violence if a country had failed to enact
reforms? Among IMF borrowers, do we see more positive outcomes among those who
implement reforms or those who fail to implement reforms?
Chapter 2 explores how IMF austerity impacts labor rights. This chapter provides
evidence that global respect for labor rights has been declining in the 21 st century. IMF
austerity provides one explanation this decline. Labor reforms, budget cuts, privatization,
and free trade reforms are tied to factors that weaken labor, reduce the costs to firms for
violating labor rights, and make it harder for workers to organize collectively. Rather
than any single policy, austerity as a policy package is seen as mutually reinforcing. As
the percent of austerity policies increase there is less room for leaders to compensate
those who lose out from reform. I hypothesize that as the percentage of IMF conditions
implemented increases, respect for collective labor rights will decrease. Low compliance,
leader behavior, and IMF reforms in the 21 st century are offered as explanations that may
lead to a null finding; this counterfactual is used in subsequent chapters as well.
Empirical evidence finds support for the hypothesis that IMF austerity undermines labor
rights.
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between IMF lending and violent protest.
This chapter outlines three hypotheses. The first two hypotheses tie IMF austerity to
grievances in society. Grievances are caused by the effects of austerity reforms as well as
the perceived “unfairness” with the choice of reform. The first hypothesis tests whether
violent protests are less common when IMF loans are from the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF) or the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). These
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loans are supposed to have pro-poor growth policies and social welfare spending floors
built in and therefore should generate fewer grievances. The second hypothesis tests
whether higher levels of compliance are associated with an increase in violent protest.
The third hypothesis builds on theories of opportunity and protest cycles to argue that
violent protests are large at the start of IMF lending but decrease in the years after.
Violence can resurface as the effects of reforms are felt over time or countries sign up for
new loans and agree to additional austerity. Thus, violent protest follows a cyclical
relationship with time under IMF lending. Empirical tests support hypothesis 2 and 3 but
find little support for hypothesis 1.
Chapter 4 studies the relationship between IMF austerity and government
repression of physical integrity rights. Repression is hypothesized to increase under IMF
lending as a function of three mechanisms. First, cuts to police and military budgets can
cause grievances among state agents who may use repression to supplement their income
or as an emotional response to an increased workload and decreased standard of living.
Second, grievances among citizens increase the amount of dissent, such as violent protest
as argued in chapter 2. Dissent increases threats to leader power. As the size of these
threats increases, the use of repression becomes more likely. Finally, IMF austerity taxes
state capacity. With a restricted budget, and a large set of reforms to implement, leaders
must use their political capital on compliance leaving few tools to address dissent.
Repression becomes more likely as other policy tools are restricted. Empirical tests find
show that repression increases as compliance with IMF lending increases.
This project represents an important advance in the current literature. It speaks to
how International Organizations can affect domestic policy. It speaks to the relationship
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between compliance with international agreements and domestic politics. It also provides
evidence that austerity as an economic reform strategy causes significant societal harm.
Finally, it provides evidence in support of human rights scholars who have long argued
that IMF program lending is incompatible with the protection of human rights. While the
IMF may suffer from other institutional shortcomings, this project provides evidence that
austerity as a reform strategy causes a wide array of societal problems that likely
undermine IMF efforts at promoting recovery.
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Chapter 1: IMF Compliance and Labor Rights in the 21st Century
The Greek government has been under IMF program lending since 2010. In
exchange for several bailouts the IMF has asked for significant reforms including: cuts to
pensions, minimum wage freezes, dismantling collective bargaining agreements, cuts to
social welfare policies, and the privatization of state enterprises. IMF austerity reforms
are also known as conditionality: measures that significantly cut government budgets and
promote neoliberal reforms. Austerity is unpopular in Greece and has sparked over a
hundred anti-austerity protests and brought the far-left Syriza party to power for the first
time in history.49 One of the largest criticisms of IMF austerity is the harm it causes to
labor rights and workers; dismantling in a few years what the Greek labor movement took
decades to win. US State Department reports on Human Rights in Greece show a marked
decline in respect for labor rights between 2010 and 2015. Labor rights had been
improving prior to 2010, but by 2015 anti-union discrimination, gender discrimination,
child labor, and forced labor were on the rise, with unions and protesters placing the
blame on IMF austerity.50
There is increasing evidence that austerity as an economic recovery package has
been a bust. In 2013 the IMF admitted that austerity had caused significant damage to
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Greece (economically, politically, and socially) and failed to help the economy recover.51
An IMF study in 2016 by three prominent IMF economists found that austerity had failed
to deliver growth and had significantly increased global inequality and instability both of
which undermine growth.52 In the scholarly literature IMF lending is largely seen as a
failure, at best having no effect and at worst undermining growth and human rights. 53
While most agree that IMF lending has been a failure, the cause of this failure is heavily
disputed. This paper addresses this dispute in the context of labor rights.
The IMF has long been accused of promoting a set of reforms that harm labor
rights.54 These reforms have also been tied to a host of other negative societal outcomes
such as: increased poverty and inequality,55 negative health and education outcomes,56
increased violations of women’s rights,57 and increased repression.58 In most of this
literature compliance with IMF austerity is the cause of negative outcomes as these
policies undermine human rights respect. Scholars of international organizations and
political economy have argued that poor outcomes are the result of low compliance and
adverse selection. The IMF continues to lend to governments which do not implement
reforms. If governments had enacted the difficult but necessary reforms then we would
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have seen better outcomes.59 For these scholars, non-compliance with IMF austerity is the
cause of negative outcomes.
These two narratives are separated by a critical but untested assumption
surrounding compliance with IMF conditionality. In both sets of arguments compliance is
systematically missing from the empirical analysis despite being the causal mechanism
driving these theories. A direct test of the relationship between compliance with IMF
austerity and outcomes of interest is missing from the literature. This is due to data
limitations as measures of compliance are rare (outside of small samples) or too blunt.
This paper moves the debate forward by introducing a measure of compliance
with IMF conditionality to test how compliance affects government respect for collective
labor rights. Using a partial proportional odds model on a sample of 74 IMF borrowers
between 2002 and 2015, I find support for the hypothesis that greater compliance leads to
declines in respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining.
Labor Rights in the 21st Century
Labor rights represent the rights that workers have in the workplace and govern
employer-employee relations. Government protection of labor rights is indirect unlike
many other human rights. Labor rights require the government to mediate the relationship
between employers and employees. In the case of private employers, the government acts
as a referee. In public employment the government is both a referee and the employer.
Labor rights apply to anyone with any desire to work in a job that pays well, is fulfilling,
dignified, and provides a feeling of societal contribution.60 Where labor rights are
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respected we are more likely to see a strong middle class, democratic institutions, and the
protection of other human rights.61
Labor rights are outlined in international human rights documents including: The
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Labour
Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Employees have the right to unionize and bargain collectively, to equal pay and nondiscrimination, freedom from forced and child labor, among many others. While labor
rights are often vaguely worded and hard to define, the definitions have been significantly
narrowed over time by the ILO in 189 conventions and 205 recommendations. 62 The
concept of progressive realization provides a useful analytic tool for determining whether
governments are protecting labor rights. Progressive realization is the concept that respect
for economic rights should improve over time and that states must use the maximum
resources available to this end. 63 This suggests that even if a country has poor respect for
labor rights we should see improvements over time. Labor rights should be improving
across the globe both as a function of progressive realization and as the human rights
regime plays a larger role on state behavior. 64, 65
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In this paper I focus on government respect for collective labor rights because the
most recent work on IMF programs and labor rights has focused on these rights and
because collective labor rights should lead to improvements in other labor rights. I define
collective labor rights as the right to form unions without discrimination (freedom of
association) and the right to bargain collectively and strike. Despite the growth of the
human rights regime, labor rights have not been improving.
Labor rights have been declining since the 1980s.66 Figure 1 below shows respect
for labor rights between 2000 and 2014. Collective labor rights in practice is an additive
index composed of respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining. Each of
these measures is discrete and ranges from 0 (no respect) to 2 (full respect). After adding
them together collective labor rights practices ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values
indicating greater government respect for collective labor rights. 67 The solid smoothed
trend line plots the global average government labor rights respect over time. The dotted
line shows the linear trend between labor rights and time. This graph shows that over the
course of the 21st century respect for collective labor rights have declined globally. This
decline is quite significant and began long before the global recession of 2007-2008. The
trend line shows a clear negative relationship. Labor rights have been declining despite
the requirement of progressive realization and increasing legitimacy of the human rights
regime. This paper identifies one cause of this decline: the implementation of IMF
austerity.
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IMF Austerity
IMF conditionality encompasses a broad set of neoliberal economic policies
aimed at reducing government spending, privatizing state owned enterprising, removing
barriers to trade and capital mobility, reducing government size, as well as increasing
labor market flexibility. As a whole, conditionality aims to remove government
intervention in the market which in turn is meant to promote economic growth. These
reforms are designed to address perceived structural problems in the country that
undermine economic growth and development. Successful completion of reforms should
therefore help countries recover from economic trouble and attract investment from
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market actors.68 The empirical literature however has largely shown that IMF austerity
has at best had no impact and at worst slowed growth. 69
IMF austerity has also been tied to a variety of negative societal outcomes. On top
of failing to promote economic recovery, IMF lending has been associated with increased
poverty and inequality,70 negative health and education outcomes,71 increased violations
of women’s rights,72 and increased repression. 73 The literature tying IMF conditionality
to increased violations of labor rights is particularly large.74 These literatures tend to
point to the hardships that IMF reforms place on citizens. The poor, women, children,
minorities, and other vulnerable groups in society tend to pay the costs of reform rather
than business or capital. This literature points to the policies contained in IMF
agreements as well as the larger policy package as a source for creating hardships and
conditions that make human rights violations more likely. These studies assume that
countries are implementing the policies theorized to cause these human rights violations.
None of these actually test the relationship between compliance in large part
because there is almost no systematic data on compliance. Where this data does exist, it is
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in small samples or on a small number of conditions. 75 This lack of data on IMF
compliance has led scholars to attempt to use more advanced statistical techniques to
account for compliance. 76 These approaches have introduced additional assumptions and
are far less accessible to the scholarly and policy communities. A simpler approach as
advocated here is to measure compliance directly.

One criticism levied at the human rights and IMF literature is that compliance is
notoriously low.77 Most countries under IMF lending implement very few of the
conditions. Figure 2 above shows the distribution of compliance with IMF conditionality.
The x-axis shows the percentage of IMF conditionality that a country implemented in a
year. The y-axis shows the frequency of country-years at each level of implementation. In
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any given year countries only comply with an average of 39% of the conditions that are
evaluated by the IMF Executive Board. There are also very few countries which
implement more than 70% of conditions in an IMF loan. Similarly, there are quite a few
observations with no implementation (0%). Low compliance has therefore been one
reason that these studies have been suspect. An alternative argument is that rather than
IMF policies, governments which are not serious about reform are the ones who sign up.
They do not enact reforms and violate labor rights and the IMF takes the blame. Given
the graph above this seems to be a reasonable counterfactual.
Now that there is data on IMF compliance it is possible to distinguish which of
these arguments holds water. There is also significant variation in compliance between
countries; Figure 2 looks normally distributed. This allows for a test of how compliance
affects labor rights. If countries are not implementing reforms, then none of the
mechanisms outlined in the literature should operate. Instead declines in human rights
may be caused by some other factor. Compliance as a causal mechanism is thus critical to
almost any theory tying IMF conditionality to a decline in labor rights (as well as other
socio-economic conditions).
Compliance with IMF Austerity and Labor Rights
IMF austerity negatively impacts labor rights through more than one mechanism.
All of these mechanisms rely on compliance with conditionality in order for them to
operate. Given that compliance with IMF austerity reforms in the 21 st century is under
40% there is reason to be skeptical about whether the findings of past work still hold. It is
well worth exploring how compliance fits into some of these arguments, and testing
whether these arguments still hold even when compliance is low.
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The most common argument tying IMF austerity to a decline in labor rights
centers around labor reforms included in conditionality. In the Greek example at the
beginning of this paper labor reforms (cuts to pensions, minimum wage freezes,
dismantling collective bargaining agreements) were a large part of protester opposition to
austerity. IMF labor reforms are centered around making labor more flexible and
responsive to changing market conditions. Labor laws and regulations meant to protect
workers are costly. For this reason, labor rights have often been compared to protectionist
policies and seen as an impediment to development.78 When market conditions change
these regulations make it harder for businesses to adapt and stay competitive. Labor
market flexibility attempts to mitigate these costs by making it easier for businesses to
adjust their supply and cost of labor. In practice this means making it easier to fire
workers and alter the terms of their employment. Wage freezes, layoffs of public
employees, and cuts to benefits and worker pensions are commonly contained in IMF
austerity.79 It is not surprising that the promotion of labor market flexibility has been
shown to reduces wages, job security, benefits, and the ability to unionize. 80 This is the
goal of labor flexibility reforms. This undermines the ability of union organizers to
protect workers who try to unionize or bargain collectively. 81 It also makes it harder for
workers to overcome collective action problems. 82 Taken together these reforms
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undermine collective labor rights by weakening existing unions and increasing barriers to
collective action by workers.
Budget requirements associated with IMF austerity present a second mechanism.
IMF borrowers are required to significantly cut government spending. Cuts to social
welfare spending (i.e. unemployment insurance, food subsidies, and public housing)
increase the hardship that workers face during an economic crisis. Those who are out of
work have less time to find a new job. High unemployment coupled with a weak safety
net creates competition among workers making it harder for unions to organize and
bargain collectively. Workers may give up a union drive that sees them going without
wages in favor of a job that pays. The extent of this cut is significant; past research has
shown that democracies under IMF lending tend to decrease spending on social welfare
to the level seen in autocracies. 83 Cuts to labor monitoring agencies make it less likely
that these agencies have the resources to hold firms which violate labor rights
accountable. This decreases the cost of violating labor rights for firms. Given firms are
often facing financial trouble themselves this increases the benefit of labor rights
violations which may help firms stay in business by lowering production costs. This is
especially true for multi-national firms which commit significant resources to prevent
being targeted by regulatory agencies and to fighting labor rights enforcement. 84 Budget
requirements therefore negatively impact labor rights both by shrinking the social safety
net and by increasing the likelihood that firms violate labor rights.
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IMF induced privatization of state owned enterprises can also put downward
pressure on labor rights. 85 Privatization tends to disproportionately affect women and
minorities who benefit from public employment and have a more difficult time finding
employment under equal conditions in the private sector. These groups face a higher rate
of labor violations in the private sector, and these violations are more difficult to
monitor.86 This is doubly true if spending cuts affect monitoring agencies in the way
outlined above. Free trade policies provide another mechanism. IMF austerity often asks
countries to create export processing zones (EPZs) which are exempt from domestic labor
laws. Predictably labor rights violations are larger in EPZs that in non-EPZs.87 Opening
up trade while simultaneously cutting social welfare spending, reducing the resources
used to monitor/punish labor violations, and decreasing domestic protections of workers
results in greater violations of labor rights. 88
One important point of note is that these policies by themselves may not have a
negative impact on labor rights. 89 Opening up trade while expanding social welfare
protections may lead to growth while simultaneously compensating/insuring those who
lose out.90 Leaders have wiggle room where they can alter other policies to offset
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negative costs for the losers of reform.91 When multiple policies are enacted
simultaneously on the other hand there is much less wiggle room. Austerity as a policy
package undermines labor rights respect when these policies are implemented together. 92
The reverse side of this argument implies non-implementation of large parts of IMF
austerity may give leaders wiggle room to offset some of the negative costs for workers.
Leaders could use IMF funds to buy support by investing in unemployment and low
compliance may mean that leaders get the benefits of IMF support without paying the
costs. 93
Compliance must be sufficiently high for interdependent austerity policies to have
a negative effect on labor rights. Low compliance on the other hand gives leaders room to
prevent labor rights violations if they want to. If IMF borrowers have historically
implemented very few austerity policies then declines in labor rights may not be the fault
of austerity. Instead non-compliance with reforms may give cover to leaders who
intended to dismantle labor rights anyway but wanted a scapegoat. 94 The IMF may not
alter state behavior from what it would have been. 95 Especially since the IMF continues
to lend to those who need loans even if they do not comply with conditionality. 96 The
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IMF as an International Organization may simply be inefficient. 97 Without directly
testing how compliance affects labor rights it is difficult to distinguish whether IMF
reforms are causing labor rights violations.
A final argument suggests that simply participating in an IMF program is enough
to undermine labor rights. Participation in an IMF program has been argued to signal a
commitment to pro-market reforms and this signal is more credible with more stringent
austerity. 98, 99 This allows leaders to overcome commitment problems since these
reforms are costly, unpopular, and leaders have incentive to renege on them later. 100 IMF
program participation “sends a clear signal to domestic groups, as well as the
international marketplace, that the recipient government is reforming its economy along
the lines of the ‘Washington Consensus,’” and points to an eroding collective bargaining
regime.101 However, if there is low compliance with IMF conditionality then is this really
a credible signal? Negotiating and agreeing to an international agreement and then
breaking the terms of that agreement should make market actors question the sincerity of
commitment to reform.102
Information about compliance is easily accessible in the 21 st century. Letters of
intent and country program evaluations (updated throughout the course of an IMF
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program) are published on the IMF website and program evaluations are discussed in the
news. Given the importance market actors attach to timely information it seems unlikely
that signing up for an IMF program and not implementing reforms would send a credible
signal. More likely non-compliance causes market actors to punish leaders who renege on
their commitments. This may explain why foreign investment which should be attracted
to IMF borrowers tends to decline under program lending. 103 If low compliance is
common and this information is easily accessible then the negative relationship between
IMF austerity and FDI makes sense. Simply being under an IMF program is not enough
to credibly signal a commitment to market friendly policies. High compliance therefore
can have a negative impact on labor rights both as a result of policy reform but also
indirectly as a function of the signals that it conveys to market actors. The consequences
of policy reform versus signaling are observationally equivalent and both require that the
government implements IMF austerity. This discussion implies a single hypothesis:
H1: As compliance with IMF austerity increases
government respect for collective labor rights decreases
In addition to low-compliance, in most IMF programs there are two additional
reasons to be skeptical that IMF lending undermines labor rights in the 21 st century. First,
the IMF has increasingly worked with the ILO, the International Trade Union
Confederation and civil society groups (such as domestic unions) to minimize the
negative impact of conditionality. 104 Reforms to IMF lending in the 21 st century have
attempted to address criticisms such as those levied above. The IMF has consulted with
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these organizations in order to minimize the labor consequences of austerity. Publicly the
IMF has discussed the tradeoff between competitiveness and labor rights, designing
conditionality to ensure the costs of reform are not borne too heavily by labor. 105
Second, although the IMF does not incorporate the language of human rights into
its lending agreements it is publicly committed to poverty alleviation and social welfare
spending floors. The Poverty Reduction and Growth Fund (PRGF) as well as the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) designs IMF austerity to meet the challenges of
low-income countries. Of particular note is the addition of conditions aimed at alleviating
poverty.106 Similarly, in 2009 the IMF began participating in the One UN Social
Protection Floor initiative developed by the ILO. 107 Under this initiative the IMF has
added social spending floors and encouraged social spending considered “macro-critical.”
108

These reforms suggest that the conditions which undermined labor rights in the past

may have been ameliorated by reforms to IMF lending in the 21 st century. Even if past
IMF programs undermined labor rights in the 21st century IMF austerity may not. Despite
these reforms many scholars remain skeptical, arguing that this is simply rhetoric and
program lending today is much the same as it was in the past.109 In order to determine
whether it is IMF austerity or other factors the next section outlines an empirical research
design that directly tests the effect of compliance on collective labor rights.

105

IMF 2014

106

IMF 2018a

107

IEO 2017

108

Ibid

109

Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016

45

Research Design
This paper uses a sample of IMF borrowers in the 21 st century to explore how
compliance with IMF austerity impacts labor rights. The sample consists of 74 countries
between the period 2002-2014 which were under IMF lending. The dataset consists of
panel data measured at the country-year level. Considering only IMF borrowers has
several advantages. First, it alleviates the need for a structural equation model as IMF
borrowers encompass a non-random set of countries.110
Second, this sample creates a very useful counterfactual for the argument made
above. Empirical results will tell us how more compliance affects labor rights compared
to less compliance. Therefore, IMF austerity reforms are what vary rather than any other
factor which might explain differences in outcomes and who signs up for an IMF
program.
Finally, this is a direct test of debates in the literature over what would have
happened had a country implemented IMF reforms. The limitation of this approach is that
it tells us nothing about whether IMF borrowers have worse labor rights than non-IMF
borrowers facing economic trouble. Given the nature of the compliance data (which is
missing for non-IMF borrowers) this modelling choice allows for a direct and
straightforward test of the hypothesis.
This paper uses a partial proportional odds model developed by Peterson and
Harrell (1990) and operationalized using the gologit2 program in Stata 15. This model is
appropriate for ordinal dependent variables where one or more of the predictor variables
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may have violated the proportional odds assumption. The proportional odds assumption
for ordered models assumes that the effect of a predictor is the same across all values of
the ordinal variable. In practice this assumption is often violated. This model tests
whether any of the predictors violate this assumption and if they do it calculates k-1
coefficients. If this assumption is not violated then the model is the same as an ordered
logit model. All predictor variables are lagged one year to ensure the proper order of
causality.
Dependent Variable
This paper uses two dependent variables to measure collective labor rights:
freedom of association and collective bargaining. Both variables are taken from the
forthcoming WORKER rights dataset developed by Barry, Clay, and Cingranelli. Using
US State Department Reports on Human Rights the dataset codes government respect for
labor rights in practice and in law. Coding for these rights is based on ILO standards.
Freedom of association represents the right of workers to establish and join organizations
of their choice without interference from employers. In practice this is the right to
unionize without discrimination. Collective bargaining represents the right of workers to
be represented in negotiations over labor disputes. In practice this represents the right of
unions to bargain collectively and for workers to strike. Each of these indicators is
ordinal and coded: 0 (mass violations), 1 (some violations), or 2 (no violations). The use
of two dependent variables has the advantage of allowing IMF compliance to negatively
impact one of these rights while having a different effect on another. This is therefore a
more nuanced test of the theory outlined above.
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Independent Variable
The main independent variable included in this analysis is IMF compliance. This
variable measures the percentage of IMF conditions met in a country year which ranges
from 0 to 100. It is coded as the number of conditions which the IMF executive board
determined were met divided by the total number of conditions evaluated in a year. This
variable is taken from the SCIP dataset developed by the author and is an original
compliance measure. This is the most direct measure of IMF compliance as it provides a
single number to explain whether or not borrowers have implemented reforms. It does not
on its own distinguish between how many conditions a country was tasked with
implementing (severity), how difficult those conditions were (depth), or how many policy
areas those conditions covered (scope). Although these are shortcomings, this measure is
a major improvement over past empirical work which has assumed compliance away or
used a dichotomous measure indicating a country had complied or not. The distribution
of this variable can be seen in Figure 2 above.
The empirical analysis includes a number of control variables that the literature
has found to be important determinants of labor rights and might reasonably be
associated with IMF program compliance. Higher levels of democracy should correspond
to better respect for labor rights.111 More democratic countries have greater constraints on
leader behavior and a larger set of institutions through which workers might demand
better labor protections. Regime type has also been theorized as an important determinant
of whether countries comply with international agreements. 112 The models in the paper
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include the polity2 measure of democracy taken from the Polity IV project. This measure
ranges from -10 to 10 with higher values indicating a more democratic state and a more
constrained leader.
Unemployment weakens the power of labor relative to capital113 and may affect
the government’s decision to implement reforms. A measure of unemployment as a
percentage of the total labor force in included. This measure is taken from the World
Bank World Development Indicator (WDI) dataset. Labor protests represent the strength
and organization of laborers in a country. Protest may limit the implementation of IMF
conditions 114 and affect government decisions to protect labor rights. A measure of the
yearly number of labor protests is included. This measure is taken from the Mass
Mobilization dataset.115
The ideological position of the government should have a large impact on both
compliance with IMF reforms and protection of labor rights.116 Leftist governments have
traditionally been pro-labor and should therefore protect labor rights. I include a
dichotomous measure of whether the leader of a country is considered to the left on an
ideological scale. This measure is taken from the Database of Political Institutions.
Governments that repress citizens may also be more willing to implement economic
reforms which harm citizens.117 I include the Physical Integrity Rights index taken from
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the CIRI human rights dataset. This variable is coded from 0 to 8 with higher values
indicating a less repressive government.
In countries where there is a larger population it may be harder to organize unions
or strikes while at the same time it may be more difficult to implement large scale
reforms. I include the logged population size of a country. State capacity and wealth
should affect the ability of the state to implement reforms which might lead workers to
act collectively. Wealth has also been used as a proxy for economic grievances. I include
the logged value of GDP per capita as a measure of state capacity and other grievances in
society.118 IMF reforms should generate the largest benefits for countries which rely on
foreign investment and trade. Both foreign investment and trade impact labor rights
protections with researchers being split on whether this effect is positive or negative. 119
Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP and trade as a percentage of GDP are
both logged and included as control variables. All of these variables are also taken from
the World Bank WDI.
The willingness to implement reforms and the likelihood that a government does
so without compensating workers should be conditional on need for IMF financing.
Another option is for leaders to end IMF agreements prematurely rather than continue
dismantling labor protections. Controlling for the probability of exit alleviates issues of
non-random sample selection as the decision to exit an IMF program is based on similar
factors as the decision to enter one. 120
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To control for this, I design a logistic regression model predicting early exit from
IMF lending. The decision to end an IMF program early is a function of: economic
conditions, the willingness of the IMF to lend, and political considerations. The
dependent variable is coded as 1 if an IMF program ended earlier than it was scheduled
(both in the original agreement and in revisions of that agreement) and 0 if it did not end
early in a given year. Early exit is a function of economic health (current account
balance, inflation, GDP growth, and overall wealth), political considerations (regime
type), and the willingness of the IMF to continue lending (the number of IMF borrowers,
US economic aid), as well as yearly fixed effects which capture variation in IMF funding
and external shocks (such as the global recession). The predicted values of this equation
are then included as a control variable to capture both selection into an IMF program and
the probability that a country ends an IMF program early. This equation and a discussion
of the model specification can be found in the appendix.
Results
Table 1 contains the results from two partial proportional odds models. None of
the regressors included in either Model 1 or Model 2 violate the parallel line assumption.
This model therefore simplifies to the ordered logit model. Turning first to the control
variables it appears that countries which had better collective labor rights in the preceding
year also have better labor rights in the current year which was expected. Countries with
better physical integrity rights (in Model 2 only) and those with more labor protests (in
both models) tend to have better collective labor practices. Somewhat oddly, leftist
governments tend to have worse respect for collective labor practices, though this may
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make sense if these governments are trying to credibly signal a willingness to promote
market reforms.121
Both models show that as compliance with IMF reforms increases government
respect for collective labor rights decreases. In Model 1 as IMF compliance increases,
respect for freedom of association declines. These results are statistically significant at
the 95% level with a two-tail test. In Model 2, collective bargaining rights decline as IMF
compliance increases. These results are statistically significant at the 90% level. This is
encouraging given the tendency of MLE models with small samples to downwardly bias
coefficients.122 The small sample size used here is a more stringent test of Hypothesis 1.
The results from this table provide support for Hypothesis 1.
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Table 1. Proportional Odds Models

IMF compliance
GDP growth
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protests
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
Probability of IMF exit
Lagged DV
Constant 1
Constant 2

Model 1
Freedom of Association

Model 2
Collective Bargaining

-0.016***
(0.006)
-0.020
(0.041)
0.017
(0.026)
-0.141
(0.122)
0.077
(0.119)
0.021
(0.081)
0.119
(0.364)
0.185**
(0.089)
0.013
(0.018)
-0.521*
(0.299)
0.157
(0.099)
0.319
(1.976)
2.928***
(0.285)
0.064
(3.260)
-4.490
(3.273)

-0.015*
(0.008)
0.064*
(0.035)
0.021
(0.031)
0.204
(0.135)
0.066
(0.140)
-0.019
(0.125)
0.457
(0.479)
0.159***
(0.059)
-0.009
(0.019)
-0.748**
(0.322)
0.395***
(0.113)
-2.385
(2.185)
3.559***
(0.344)
-8.420**
(4.001)
-13.699***
(3.958)

404
74

404
74

Observations
Number of countries

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These models can be difficult to interpret. Using the margins commands in Stata
15, the two plots below show the probability that freedom of association (Figure 3) and
collective bargaining (Figure 4) will take on the values 0, 1, or 2. The in-sample
probabilities use the actual values of all of the control variables but vary the value of IMF
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compliance over its full range. The resulting predictions show how varying levels of
compliance affect the probability that a country respects labor rights. These probabilities
add up to 1, so as the probability of one value decreases the probability of another value
must increase. This plot is useful for discussing these results and showing them visually
as it provides much more information than the table.

Figure 3 plots the predicted effects of IMF compliance on freedom of association.
The x-axis represents the percent of IMF conditions evaluated which were implemented.
The y-axis represents the probability of seeing any particular outcome. Mass violations
correspond to a score of 0, some violation to a score of 1, and no violations to a score of
2. In Figure 3 the probability of seeing no violations declines 12%; from about 23% with
0% compliance down to around 11% with 100% compliance. As countries implement
more conditions they are less likely to have high respect for freedom of association. The
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probability of seeing some violations declines slightly from about 58% down to 52%
though the confidence intervals overlap at all points across the x-axis. For mass violations
there is a pronounced increase of about 20% as IMF compliance increases from 0 to
100%. When countries implement more IMF conditions they are more likely to score a 0
on freedom of association. Although it is hard to tell, the decline in 1 and 2 values at
higher values of implementation suggest that countries are moving from full respect to
some respect at a lower rate than they are moving from some respect to no respect.
Figure 4 shows the predicted effect of IMF compliance on collective bargaining.
The labels correspond to the same values as those in Figure 3. We see a somewhat similar
picture. The probability of seeing no collective bargaining violations declines from
around 11% to 5% over the range of compliance. The confidence bands around these
predictions are quite tight though they overlap over the range of compliance values. The
probability of seeing some violations declines more steeply than in Figure 3. When a
country implements 0% of conditions the probability of seeing some violations is 55%.
This value drops to 46% when countries implement 100% of policies. The probability of
mass violations once again significantly increases from 33% with no compliance to 49%
with full compliance. This graph tells much the same story as the one above. Countries
are moving from full respect to some respect as a slower rate than they are moving from
some respect to no respect for collective bargaining rights.
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Overall these findings present support for Hypothesis 1. IMF compliance has a
statistically significant effect on both freedom of association and collective bargaining.
This suggests that countries which implement IMF reforms in the 21 st century tend to
violate collective labor rights at higher levels than they would have had they
implemented fewer IMF conditions.
Robustness Checks
A series of robustness checks can be found in Appendix A. One such check is
reported below. Mokkan scaling analysis suggests that freedom of association and
collective bargaining can be combined into a single scale. 123 The collective labor rights
scale ranges from 0 to 4 with higher values indicating better respect for labor rights. Past
work has tended to look at a single measure of labor rights and the findings above as well
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as the Mokkan scaling analysis suggests that this approach is still appropriate for
collective labor rights from this dataset.
I re-estimate the model above using ordinary least squares with panel corrected
standard errors. This model is appropriate when the number of countries in a sample (74
in this case) is much larger than the number of time periods (13 years). The model
assumes heteroskedasticity in the panels. Once again, all variables are lagged one year to
minimize the possibility of simultaneity. Fixed effects are added to evaluate whether this
relationship holds within countries over time.
The main findings of this model are the same as the partial proportional odds
model above with some differences among the control variables. Countries which had
better labor rights in the previous year, experienced growth, which are poorer, have labor
protests, low unemployment, and do not have a leftist leader tend to see better
government respect for collective labor rights in practice. Although fixed effects were
added the control variables in this model perform better than in models 1 and 2 likely
because OLS models are better suited to handling small sample sizes than maximum
likelihood. The R-square of 0.76 suggests that this model explains a lot of the variance in
collective labor rights.
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Table 2. OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Model 3
Collective labor rights
IMF compliance
GDP growth
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protests
Unemployment,
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
Probability of IMF exit
Lagged DV
Constant

-0.005***
(0.002)
0.019*
(0.010)
-0.038
(0.032)
-0.306
(0.721)
-0.370**
(0.152)
-0.066
(0.053)
0.213
(0.269)
0.027**
(0.013)
-0.065***
(0.020)
-0.299**
(0.139)
0.059
(0.040)
0.444
(0.573)
0.295***
(0.064)
7.036
(11.041)

Observations
404
Number of countries
74
R-squared
0.762
Fixed effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Once again as IMF compliance increases collective labor practices decrease.
Figure 5 below plots the in-sample predictions from Model 3, once again using the
margins command in Stata 15. This figure includes 95% confidence intervals around
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these predictions. These predictions are much more straightforward than the partial
proportional odds graphs, but show the same relationship. Moving from 0% compliance
to 100% compliance decreases respect for collective labor rights by about 0.5.

As compliance moves from 0% of conditions to 100% of conditions labor
practices decline by about 0.5. Most countries show little to no change in collective labor
practices from one year to the next. So a decrease of 0.5 is quite large. The average
country implements around 40% of IMF conditions and if they stay under IMF program
lending for 5 years (about 25% of the sample) then labor rights decline by 1 unit. This is
quite large given that labor rights rarely change from year to year and the scale only takes
on five values. The confidence intervals around these predictions are quite tight around
the middle though wider at the extremes. These results once again provide support for
Hypothesis 1.
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Beyond the OLS model presented above, Appendix A contains a number of
additional robustness checks including: a bivariate ordered probit model predicting laws
and practices as conditionally related equations; predictions for freedom of association
and collective bargaining as jointly related in a bivariate ordered probit model; random
effects; additional IMF controls such as the type of loan, the time under IMF lending, and
the size of the loan; non-IMF controls such as the electoral system, the time a leader has
been in office, US economic aid, level of economic liberalization, labor abundance of the
country, and migrant remittances; and a non-OECD sample. The results remain robust to
all of these model specifications.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that compliance with IMF conditionality undermines
respect for collective bargaining rights. When governments implement austerity reforms
it leads to more violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining. Labor
rights have been declining for decades and the findings here suggest that the IMF has
been a major contributor to this decline. Austerity policies themselves are designed to
weaken labor and the implementation of these policies has been shown to do exactly that.
The literature tying IMF lending to a decline in labor rights and the welfare of
workers is large. Scholars have long associated IMF lending with declines in wages,
working conditions, equal pay, anti-union discrimination, and violence against labor
organizers. These findings have often been treated with skepticism given that compliance
with reforms is low. The findings here provide support for this literature as well as the
wider literature tying IMF lending to negative human rights in general. When
governments follow through on their commitments to the IMF citizens suffer. While
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adverse selection and political interference may indeed undermine the success of IMF
lending, the policies themselves are incompatible with the protection of labor rights.
Despite efforts to work with the ILO and labor unions, austerity policies themselves will
continue to undermine labor rights unless protections for these rights are incorporated
into lending agreements. If the IMF is truly concerned with protecting workers then these
rights should be built into agreements and the disbursement of loans should be
conditional on the protection of these rights.
International organizations can have a large impact on domestic politics and the
way governments treat their citizens. When these organizations do not evaluate the
human rights consequences of their actions and do not build human rights protections
into their agreements we are likely to see human rights violations. The IMF is not the
only International Organizations that is guilty of this and as the number of International
Organizations increase the potential for harm increases as well.
Despite the findings here there remain a large number of questions. Do these
results hold for other types of labor rights? Are certain IMF conditions more harmful than
others? Do some IMF conditions improve labor rights such as efforts to collect data and
strengthen the legal system? Do non-IMF borrowers under austerity see the same rate of
labor rights violations? How do labor rights fare in the years after IMF lending has ended
and is there evidence of a J-curve?
Austerity has been the dominant policy package for economic reform since the
1980s. Building on neoliberal economic theory governments have been pressured into
slashing their budgets, their safety nets, de-regulating labor markets, privatizing stateowned enterprises, and promoting free trade. Despite these reforms most developing
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countries have not seen faster economic recovery or greater development. Instead
inequality and declines in economic rights have followed as governments have proved
unable or unwilling to compensate the losers of these reforms. The evidence here ties
austerity directly to declines in labor rights. Given the failures of austerity to address the
global crisis in 2007, and the empirical evidence provided here it is becoming
increasingly evident that austerity and human rights protections are not compatible.
Where human rights decline we are more likely to see conflict, political instability,
corruption, and economic crisis. Austerity has not generated the benefits it was theorized
to and tweaking the reforms is unlikely to solve this problem. Instead human rights led
development should be adopted as a means to promote peace and economic development
especially in International Organizations associated with the United Nations like the IMF.
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Appendix A - This appendix is meant to provide robustness checks for the main findings
in chapter 1. This is meant to test how sensitive the negative relationship between IMF
compliance and labor rights is, and see if this relationship disappears when using
alternative model specifications or additional control variables. All models use a two-tail
test.

These robustness checks are summarized here:
•

1a. Logistic regression of IMF exit probability

•

2a. Collective labor rights pre-2008 and 2008-2014

•

3a. Freedom of association and collective bargaining pre-2008 and 2008-2014

•

4a. Bivariate ordered probit for collective labor laws and practices

•

5a. Bivariate ordered probit for freedom of association and collective bargaining

•

6a. IMF control variables for collective practices

•

7a. IMF control variables for freedom of association and collective bargaining

•

8a. Non-IMF controls for collective practices

•

9a. Non-IMF controls for freedom of association and collective practices

•

10a. Bootstrapped standard errors for an ordered probit model

•

11a. Non-OECD sample
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Appendix table 1a models IMF exit probability. This model predicts whether a country
leaves an IMF program earlier than was agreed upon. Predictions from this model are
used in chapter 1 as a control variable. Countries under IMF lending in the previous year,
those who trade a lot, and a low number of IMF borrowers globally all increase the
probability of early exit.

Appendix table 1a. Logistic regression Model 1a
IMF exit
IMF participation (T-1)

1.723**
(0.767)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
0.006
(0.050)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
0.013
(0.023)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
0.019
(0.028)
Population (logged)
0.322*
(0.181)
GDP per capita (logged)
0.252
(0.193)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
-0.121
(0.181)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
1.195**
(0.555)
US economic aid
0.000
(0.000)
Democracy
0.089
(0.054)
Number of IMF borrowers
-0.284***
(0.098)
Constant
-5.246
(5.698)
Year fixed effects
YES
Observations
462
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 2a uses the collective practices variable from the robustness section of
chapter 1. This model is split into the pre-2008 and 2008 forward periods. This is to
control for changes to IMF funding and reforms which occurred in response to the global
financial crisis. The results here remain unchanged even with this smaller sample.
Appendix table 2a. OLS with PCSE and fixed effects. Model 2a Model 3a
Collective practices
2008-2014 2002-2007
Lagged DV
IMF compliance
GDP growth
Democracy
Total Population logged
GDP per capita logged
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights index
Probability of IMF exit
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of countries
72

0.053
(0.080)
-0.005*
(0.003)
0.019
(0.017)
-0.035
(0.044)
-1.818
(1.644)
-0.093
(0.521)
-0.090
(0.083)
0.068
(0.448)
0.043**
(0.017)
-0.031
(0.027)
-0.675***
(0.257)
0.098*
(0.058)
0.691
(0.772)
29.773
(24.299)

0.245*
(0.145)
-0.008***
(0.003)
0.014
(0.012)
-0.100***
(0.028)
-4.354***
(1.316)
0.323*
(0.194)
-0.082
(0.072)
1.415***
(0.444)
-0.007
(0.057)
0.077**
(0.033)
0.021
(0.096)
-0.046
(0.044)
-0.625
(0.593)
62.762***
(20.528)

232
0.760
62

172
0.913
53

Fixed effects
YES
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix table 3a uses the same model specification as appendix table 2a but uses
freedom of association and collective bargaining broken down by time period. Results
which violate the parallel line assumption have a second coefficient estimated in the
Gamma2 equation. The results here once again support those in chapter 1. The one
exception is model 6 in which IMF compliance is not significant. This is likely due to the
small sample size (242 cases) and use of an MLE model. Model 7 also seems to blow up
in the gamma2 equation suggesting that this model is poorly specified. Once again this
makes sense given the small sample size (172 cases) and use of an MLE model. This
does provide some evidence that the model fits better for freedom of association than it
does for collective bargaining.
Appendix table 3a.
Partial proportional
odds model
Equation
Beta

Lagged DV
IMF compliance
Democracy
Population
(logged)
GDP per capita
logged
FDI (% of GDP
logged)
Trade (% of GDP
logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist

Model 4a
Freedom of
association
2008-2014

Model 5a
Freedom of
association
2002-2007

Model 6a
Collective
bargaining
2008-2014

Model 7a
Collective
bargaining
2002-2007

1.896***
(0.298)
-0.019***
(0.007)
0.043
(0.034)
-0.232
(0.163)
0.032
(0.147)
0.060
(0.141)
0.141
(0.478)
0.222**
(0.095)
0.009
(0.018)
-0.823**

5.555***
(0.729)
-0.038***
(0.014)
0.020
(0.066)
-0.110
(0.256)
0.590**
(0.252)
0.089
(0.161)
-0.741
(0.776)
-0.273
(0.297)
-0.026
(0.065)
-0.276

2.405***
(0.312)
-0.010
(0.008)
0.074*
(0.039)
-0.077
(0.184)
-0.311*
(0.166)
0.394**
(0.167)
-0.310
(0.648)
0.158**
(0.066)
-0.010
(0.022)
-1.400***

8.328***
(2.314)
-0.050**
(0.024)
0.020
(0.113)
0.613
(0.595)
0.998
(0.609)
-0.358
(0.343)
0.273
(1.241)
-0.418
(0.664)
0.133*
(0.080)
-1.321
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government
Physical integrity
rights index
Probability of
IMF exit
Constant

(0.365)
0.143
(0.120)
1.249
(2.565)
2.292
(4.334)

(0.799)
0.260
(0.185)
2.016
(3.626)
-1.427
(6.682)

(0.431)
0.306**
(0.144)
1.584
(3.124)
2.081
(5.081)

Gamma2 IMF compliance
Democracy
Total Population
logged
GDP per capita
logged
FDI (% of GDP
logged)
Trade (% of GDP
logged)
Labor protest

1.374***
(0.336)
0.599***
(0.210)
-0.815**
(0.359)
3.300***
(1.201)

Unemployment

-0.209***
(0.052)
1.375**

Leftist
government

(0.602)
1.383***
(0.329)
-10.595***
(3.095)

Physical integrity
rights index
Probability of
IMF exit
Lagged DV
Constant 2

-1.624
(4.293)

-8.222
(6.705)

-50.026***
(10.378)

Observations
232
172
232
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1.187)
0.586*
(0.341)
-6.706
(6.268)
-23.665
(16.920)
-20.799***
(0.872)
-93.862***
(3.942)
-179.106***
(7.448)
-430.385***
(18.063)
-487.804***
(20.483)
-844.363***
(35.457)
-65.182***
(2.754)
-92.317***
(3.921)
703.077***
(29.820)
516.376***
(21.652)
7,345.601***
(307.517)
1,488.383***
(61.401)
5,471.225***
(230.046)
172

Appendix table 4a models labor practices and labor laws a jointly related. This model
sees decisions to violate/improve laws and practices as jointly related. Leaders may
dismantle institutional protections of workers (labor laws) or they may reduce the ability
of governments to enforce laws. Alternatively, firms may choose to violate practices
rather than push for changes to laws. I choose to model laws as a function of practices
rather than the reverse though the results remain unchanged. Labor laws is a mokkan
scale composed of freedom of association laws plus collective bargaining laws. It is
constructed in the same manner as collective labor practices. IMF compliance has a
negative effect on labor practices consistent with findings in the paper. IMF compliance
however does not negatively impact labor laws. Rho in this model is insignificant
suggesting that laws and practices can be separated independently.

Appendix table 4a.
Bivariate ordered
probit.

Model 8a
Equation 1
Equation 2
Labor practices
Labor laws

Labor laws
Labor practices
IMF compliance
GDP per capita
growth

1.170***
(0.116)
-0.008***
(0.003)
0.010

1.807***
(0.196)
0.323***
(0.087)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.027

(0.018)
0.004
(0.013)
-0.004
(0.060)
0.043

(0.017)
0.036**
(0.016)
-0.106
(0.087)
-0.034

Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita
(logged)
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(0.062)
0.004

(0.066)
-0.047

(0.044)
0.112

(0.057)
-0.081

(0.199)
0.108***
(0.032)
0.001
(0.008)
-0.312**
(0.141)
0.131***

(0.251)
0.019
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.014)
-0.045
(0.186)
0.022

(0.049)
-0.488

(0.058)
-1.223

FDI (% of GDP
logged)
Trade (% of GDP
logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity
rights
Probability of IMF
exit

(0.990)
1.592
(1.664)
2.438
(1.683)
4.516***
(1.702)
5.869***
(1.697)
404

(1.004)
Cut 1
-1.698
(2.306)
Cut 2
-0.033
(2.254)
Cut 3
2.996
(2.253)
Cut 4
4.951**
(2.237)
Observations
404
Rho
0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 5a sees decisions to violate freedom of association and collective
bargaining as interrelated. Firms for example may choose to discriminate against union
workers and punish workers for striking. Governments decisions to enforce collective
bargaining practices may depend on whether freedom of association has led to the
creation of strong unions who might opposed such moves. Rho in this model is quite
large 0.56*** and significant suggesting that freedom of association practices and
collective bargaining practices are interrelated.

Appendix table 5a.
Bivariate ordered probit
IMF compliance
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Democracy
Total Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
Probability of IMF exit
Lagged DV
Cut 1

Model 9a
Collective bargaining Freedom of association
-0.008**
(0.004)
0.041**
(0.020)
0.012
(0.020)
0.094
(0.085)
0.024
(0.078)
-0.037
(0.067)
0.275
(0.240)
0.088**
(0.042)
-0.006
(0.012)
-0.394**
(0.171)
0.236***
(0.061)
-1.342
(1.169)
1.873***
(0.147)
4.340**
(2.166)
77

-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.018)
0.012
(0.018)
-0.091
(0.080)
0.042
(0.076)
0.015
(0.063)
0.076
(0.223)
0.103**
(0.047)
0.005
(0.011)
-0.289*
(0.158)
0.096*
(0.055)
0.293
(1.072)
1.577***
(0.131)
-0.253
(2.031)

Cut 2

7.270***
(2.190)
404

2.324
(2.029)
Observations
404
Rho
0.56***
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 6a models collective labor practices as both an ordered probit model (due
to convergence issues with the partial proportional odds model) and as an OLS model
with fixed effects. A battery of IMF control variables from the SCIP dataset are included
such as the time under IMF lending, the size of the IMF loan, and the specific type of
loan. The results are unchanged from chapter 1. Higher levels of compliance lead to an
increase in violations of collective labor practices.

Appendix table 6a.
IMF controls

Lagged DV
IMF compliance
Time under IMF lending
IMF loan size
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loan
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan
Standby Arrangement (SBA)
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
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Model 10a
Ordered probit

Model 11a
OLS with
PCSE

1.157***
(0.119)
-0.009***
(0.003)
0.006
(0.020)
0.017
(0.045)
0.221
(0.317)
0.236
(0.180)
-0.346
(0.332)
0.146
(0.193)
0.027
(0.294)
-0.041
(0.234)
-0.647
(0.522)
0.007
(0.013)
0.002
(0.063)
0.056
(0.092)
0.010

0.281***
(0.066)
-0.006***
(0.002)
0.036
(0.024)
-0.056
(0.044)
0.191
(0.349)
-0.279
(0.319)
-0.537
(0.419)
0.172
(0.165)
-0.068
(0.242)
-0.020
(0.323)
-0.448
(0.464)
-0.041
(0.031)
-0.355
(0.848)
-0.387**
(0.187)
-0.073

(0.044)
0.132
(0.196)
0.107***
(0.031)
0.002
(0.009)
-0.324**
(0.135)
0.122**
(0.052)
-0.564
(0.992)
1.891
(1.709)
2.744
(1.723)
4.824***
(1.760)
6.188***
(1.763)
-

Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
Probability of IMF exit
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Constant

(0.055)
0.289
(0.297)
0.031**
(0.013)
-0.066***
(0.019)
-0.349**
(0.144)
0.038
(0.039)
0.286
(0.579)
7.830
(13.440)

Observations
404
404
R-squared
0.765
0.37
Number of countries
74
74
Fixed effects
NO
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The reference category for the type of IMF loan is Extended Credit Facilities (ECF)
 This value corresponds to a pseudo R2
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Appendix table 7a is the same model specification from table 6a using freedom of
association and collective bargaining. The main finding remains the same. A number of
the IMF loan categories violate the proportional odds assumption. The type of IMF loan
does seem affect labor rights which suggests an avenue for future research. What is
surprising is that non-concessional loans like ESF, EFF loans are associated with better
labor rights that loans designed to protect the poor. The overall findings however suggest
that even controlling for the type of loan, time under an IMF program, and the size of a
loan compliance still has a statistically significant negative effect on labor rights.
Appendix table 7a. Partial proportional odds
model. IMF controls
Equation
Beta
Lagged DV
IMF compliance
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF)
loan
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan
Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) loan
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan
Standby Arrangement (SBA)
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan
Total access in millions of SDR
logged
Years under IMF lending
GDP growth
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Model 12a
Freedom of
association

Model 13a
Collective
bargaining

2.880***
(0.286)
-0.020***
(0.007)
1.087*
(0.653)
12.987***

3.449***
(0.353)
-0.017**
(0.008)
-0.642
(1.082)
12.510***

(0.988)
11.360***
(1.248)
0.478

(0.923)
11.305***
(1.259)
0.055

(0.378)
0.128
(0.625)
0.089
(0.511)
-1.570*
(0.895)
-0.051

(0.516)
-0.248
(0.715)
-0.129
(0.608)
-13.493***
(0.969)
0.189*

(0.106)
-0.027
(0.044)
-0.016

(0.096)
0.019
(0.058)
0.078**

(0.047)
0.021
(0.028)
-0.107
(0.148)
0.174
(0.204)
0.032
(0.082)
0.163
(0.419)
0.188**
(0.090)
0.013
(0.020)
-0.568*
(0.316)
0.132
(0.109)
0.773
(2.019)
-1.028
(4.050)

Democracy
Total Population logged
GDP per capita logged
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights index
Probability of IMF exit
Constant
Gamma
2

Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan

Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF)
loan
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan

-12.046***
(1.157)
-13.679***
(1.199)

Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan
Unemployment
Constant

Observations

-11.280***
(0.956)
0.013
(0.020)
-5.646
(4.050)

(0.033)
0.011
(0.031)
0.156
(0.141)
-0.109
(0.197)
-0.037
(0.116)
0.369
(0.448)
0.174***
(0.049)
0.017
(0.023)
-0.782**
(0.322)
0.421***
(0.115)
-2.944
(2.344)
-7.017*
(3.790)
2.174**
(0.914)
-10.806***
(1.284)
-8.219***
(1.820)
1.712**
(0.788)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.148***
(0.051)
-11.318***
(3.811)

404
404
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The reference category for the type of IMF loan is Extended Credit Facilities (ECF)
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Appendix table 8a uses the collective labor practices and adds a number of non-IMF
controls. The substantive results of this model are unchanged from chapter 1. Higher
compliance generates a decline in labor rights. These include the electoral system, the
number of years the executive has spent in office, US economic aid, how liberalized the
country’s economy is, labor abundance, and remittances. Domestic electoral institutions
and time in office are likely to play a large role in how leaders respond to the public will
to respect labor rights. US economic aid to a country has been used in the literature as a
proxy for whether leaders are likely to be punished for non-compliance. Economic
liberalization affects how much the country benefits from austerity as the two are
composed of similar policies. Remittances and labor abundance both shape the domestic
power and resources available to labor. Labor abundant countries have been argued to
benefit from IMF reforms. Remittances can serve as a substitute for declining wages as a
result for labor practices which may make leaders more willing to enact anti-labor reform
policies.
Appendix table 8a.
Non-IMF controls
Lagged DV
IMF compliance
Assembly elected president
Presidential system
Executive years in office
US economic aid
Economic liberalization
Labor abundance
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Model 14a
Ordered probit

Model 15a
OLS with PCSE

0.413**
(0.162)
-0.011**
(0.005)
-7.617***
(0.774)
-0.804
(8.731)
-0.041
(0.042)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.980
(0.601)
-1.413e+07

0.216***
(0.068)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-1.619***
(0.348)
-0.563
(2.764)
-0.018
(0.015)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.355**
(0.181)
-4.723e+07

(3.598e+08)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.129
(0.099)
0.687
(3.125)
0.745
(1.093)
-0.280*
(0.151)
1.023
(1.058)
0.072
(0.081)
-0.148***
(0.046)
-0.470
(0.330)
0.149*
(0.088)
1.042
(1.627)
12.375
(53.220)
13.485
(53.225)
16.307
(53.222)
18.387
(53.323)

Remittance Inflows (US$ Billions)
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
Probability of IMF exit
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Constant

(1.875e+08)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.039
(0.033)
0.283
(1.018)
0.152
(0.417)
-0.082
(0.052)
0.347
(0.319)
0.011
(0.013)
-0.061***
(0.021)
-0.255*
(0.140)
0.058
(0.041)
0.406
(0.597)

-3.361
(18.118)

Observations
374
374
R-squared
0.769
0.51
Number of countries
70
70
Fixed effects
NO
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 This value corresponds to a pseudo R2
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Appendix table 9a uses the same model specification as appendix table 8a but applies it
to freedom of association and collective bargaining. Once again the results hold. Higher
levels of IMF compliance are associated with a decrease in labor rights.
Appendix table 9a. Non-IMF controls
Partial proportional odds model

Beta

Lagged DV
IMF compliance
Assembly elected president
Presidential system
Years of leader in office
US economic aid
Economic liberalization
Labor abundance
GDP growth
Democracy
Total Population logged
GDP per capita logged
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
index
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Model 16a
Freedom of
association

Model 17a
Collective
bargaining

2.667***
(0.307)
-0.016**
(0.007)
-0.305
(0.403)
0.637*
(0.363)
-0.002
(0.025)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.435*
(0.244)
79310225.242
(1.887e+08)
-0.025
(0.043)
0.003
(0.044)
-0.188
(0.157)
0.213
(0.249)
0.103
(0.108)
0.024
(0.437)
0.177**
(0.081)
0.004
(0.021)
-0.647**
(0.329)
0.134

3.475***
(0.398)
-0.015**
(0.008)
-0.886***
(0.342)
-0.418
(0.391)
-0.041*
(0.023)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.754***
(0.268)
4.591e+08**
(1.999e+08)
0.073*
(0.043)
-0.033
(0.045)
0.239
(0.176)
0.967***
(0.275)
0.135
(0.127)
0.433
(0.531)
0.211***
(0.078)
0.007
(0.024)
-0.965**
(0.377)
0.398***

Probability of IMF exit
Constant
Gamma
2

Assembly elected president

Unemployment
Constant 2

Observations

(0.105)
1.333
(2.088)
3.386
(5.128)
-0.305

(0.113)
-1.104
(2.515)
-10.765*
(5.883)
-12.743***

(0.403)
0.004
(0.021)
-1.204
(5.184)

(0.859)
-0.149***
(0.050)
-15.174**
(5.986)

374
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

86

374

Appendix model 10a. uses bootstrapped standard errors to account for the fact that IMF
compliance is a measure that likely has some error and that the probability of IMF exit is
an estimate whose measurement error has not been accounted for. These models use 50
replications. Bootsrapping does not change the findings of chapter 1. In all three models
as compliance increases we see a decline in respect for labor rights.
Appendix table 10a. Bootstrapped
Model 18a
Model 19a Model 20a
standard errors. Ordered probit
Collective labor Freedom of Collective
practices
association bargaining
Collective labor practices
IMF compliance
Democracy
Total Population logged
GDP per capita logged
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights index
Probability of IMF exit
/cut1
/cut2
/cut3
/cut4

1.173***
(0.111)
-0.008**
(0.003)
0.006
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.073)
0.039
(0.066)
0.011
(0.062)
0.120
(0.223)
0.111**
(0.047)
0.001
(0.011)
-0.302**
(0.146)
0.126**
(0.053)
-0.532
(0.998)
1.606
(2.083)
2.454
(2.107)
4.531**
(2.130)
5.879***
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2.924***
(0.285)
-0.016**
(0.008)
0.015
(0.030)
-0.146
(0.153)
0.082
(0.116)
0.009
(0.123)
0.104
(0.428)
0.187
(0.128)
0.012
(0.019)
-0.529*
(0.299)
0.163
(0.114)
0.411
(2.111)
-0.121
(4.018)
4.434
(3.990)
-

3.528***
(0.285)
-0.014*
(0.007)
0.029
(0.037)
0.220
(0.192)
0.046
(0.165)
0.023
(0.168)
0.488
(0.519)
0.145**
(0.069)
-0.004
(0.024)
-0.712*
(0.369)
0.373***
(0.113)
-2.668
(1.891)
8.469
(5.415)
13.702**
(5.476)
-

-

-

(2.137)
Observations
404
404
404
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 11a re-runs the model from table 1 in chapter 1 using a sample of nonOECD countries. Once again the results are unchanged. Higher levels of compliance
leads to a decline in respect for labor rights.
Appendix table 11a. Non-OECD sample

Equation
Beta
Lagged DV
IMF compliance
GDP growth
Democracy
Total Population logged
GDP per capita logged
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
Labor protest
Unemployment
Leftist government
Physical integrity rights
index
Probability of IMF exit

Model 21a
Freedom of
association

Model 22a
Collective
bargaining

2.827***
(0.285)
-0.018***
(0.006)
-0.012
(0.042)
0.025
(0.027)
-0.147
(0.127)
-0.023
(0.135)
0.038
(0.080)
0.191
(0.367)
0.135
(0.095)
0.008
(0.018)
-0.433
(0.305)
0.140

3.385***
(0.356)
-0.009
(0.008)
0.078**
(0.034)
0.022
(0.030)
0.065
(0.135)
-0.135
(0.141)
-0.001
(0.116)
0.101
(0.471)
0.196**
(0.092)
0.008
(0.022)
-0.732**
(0.346)
0.361***

(0.101)
-0.401
(2.201)

(0.111)
-0.798
(2.638)
3.385***
(0.356)
-3.650
(3.713)
-0.052***

Collective bargaining
Constant
Gamma
2

0.792
(3.359)

IMF compliance

(0.013)
-0.154**
(0.061)

Unemployment
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Constant 2

Observations

-3.734
(3.369)
383
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-6.263*
(3.634)
383

Chapter 2: Compliance with IMF Austerity and Violent Protest
Like most of the world, Greece was thrown into economic crisis after the global
recession of 2007. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth hit a 50 year low of -9% in
2011, and youth unemployment peaked at 58.2% in 2013. Unable to address its economic
woes, Greece accepted a bailout package in May of 2010 negotiated with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank, and the European
Commission. In exchange for the loan Greece agreed to implement a set of austerity
policies that made significant cuts to pensions, social services, wages, and public-sector
employment.
Austerity imposed at the behest of the IMF bailout was “harsher” than previous
reform efforts resulting in widespread unrest. On May 5, 2010, as the Greek Parliament
voted on austerity measures, a large, anti-austerity protest in Athens erupted into
violence. Masked youths threw petrol bombs and clashed with police. Protesters
destroyed property and citizens were killed. Police responded by throwing tear gas at
violent and non-violent protesters alike leading to claims of police repression. By the end
of 2010, between 239,000 and 422,000 protesters had taken to the streets participating in
12 violent protests (all against austerity), 11 of which resulted in clashes with police. 124

124

Estimates are taken from the Mass Mobilization Protest Dataset using both a conservative estimate and a
liberal estimate of participants variable. See Clark and Regan 2016
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This anti-austerity movement proved to be quite different than the protests that came
before it and continues at the time of this writing. 125
Debate over pension reform in 2007 sparked a series of non-violent protests, but
both confrontations between protesters and police and the use of violence by protesters
were rare. Liberal democratic institutions ensured that protesters could take to the streets
to air their demands, and a competitive electoral system allowed for citizens to replace
leaders who they disliked. Greece (even in crisis) is a developed country with a high
standard of living relative to the rest of the world. For all of these reasons, it is surprising
to see violence used by citizens as a political tool. So why did violence erupt in Greece?
What was so different about citizen’s grievances in 2010? Austerity.
Violence is one of the largest obstacles to development. When violence begins it
is difficult to stop and has significant economic costs that could potentially outweigh any
economic gains generated by austerity. Past work argues that austerity generates
collective violence by creating grievances among those who lose out during the reform
process. The empirical work testing this relationship has treated IMF austerity as either a
dichotomous state of being (you are under austerity or you are not) or looked at how long
a country spends under austerity. Although this work finds a significant relationship
between IMF program lending and collective violence, it offers few explanations for why
we see violence in Greece but not in Cape Verde or Albania when all three underwent
IMF austerity. This work also fails to explain why we see variation within countries over
time. Violent protests in Greece were widespread from 2010-2012, rare in 2013 and
2014, and widespread again in 2015 and 2016. Overall, past work has been limited by the

125

2018
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scarcity of IMF data. This paper introduces a new measure on IMF compliance that helps
explain these differences.
If IMF conditionality generates violent conflict, this may undermine many of the
arguments for economic austerity. “If the programmes are rendered inoperative by
political unrest, the question of their economic feasibility becomes largely academic.”

126

Leaders may be unwilling to implement reforms if they believe that these reforms will
lead to violence. Alternatively, austerity may lead to the replacement of austerity-friendly
leaders with those championing anti-austerity platforms thereby altering the entire
political landscape. 127
This paper explores IMF austerity and its effect on violent protest. Three
arguments are put forth to explain variation in violent protest between IMF borrowers
and within IMF borrowers over time. First, loans with less severe austerity generate less
violence. Second, violent protest increases as countries implement a larger percentage of
IMF austerity conditions. And finally, violent protest follows a cubic relationship with
the amount of time spent under IMF lending. Violent protest is highest in the beginning
of austerity, but subsides over time. However, once the consequences of austerity policy
begin to set in, and governments are forced to take out new loans, protest will increase
again.128 These arguments are tested using negative binomial models on a sample of 78
IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2014. I find support for the second and third argument
suggesting that compliance and the amount of time a country spends under IMF lending
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Auvinen 1996, p.377
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IMF programs undermine leader survival (Dreher 2004, Dreher et al. 2012).
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IMF loans last 1-4 years. If a country is still in need of assistance then they must take out a new loan.
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provide two explanations for the variance in violent protest levels in countries under IMF
lending.
International Monetary Fund Austerity
Austerity refers to a policy package which promotes a reduction in government
spending and the promotion of business-friendly reforms.129 These reforms shift power
away from the state and towards the market. 130 Austerity is distinguished from similar
types of economic reform in both the speed at which it is carried out and the starting
economic conditions. It promotes such rapid economic change through the adoption of
multiple neoliberal reform policies that it has sometimes been referred to as “shocktherapy.” 131 Austerity also occurs during times of economic trouble which distinguish it
from similar reforms during times of growth. Countries may choose austerity themselves
(such as Spain or the United Kingdom in the last decade) or in exchange for a loan from
an international lending institution such as the International Monetary Fund (for example,
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in the last decade).
IMF austerity refers to the conditionality attached to IMF lending. The IMF
provides loans to countries facing economic crisis, and in exchange those countries must
implement austerity reforms. Past work argues that IMF austerity is a one-size-fits-all
package.132 The specifics of IMF conditionality may change, but the underlying policies
themselves and what they aim to accomplish are remarkably similar. Privatization, de-
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See Stiglitz 20002; Vreeland 2007 for an overview of these policies
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Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009
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See Klein 2007
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See Stiglitz 2002; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Hartzell, Hoddie, Bauer 2010
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regulation of the labor market, free trade policies, cuts to the social welfare state, deregulation of the finance industry, and other policies associated with the “Washington
Consensus” have made up the core of austerity reforms. 133, 134 These reforms are argued
to promote growth, attract investment, and help countries resolve economic crises, but
much of the empirical literature has found little support for these arguments. 135
Variation in the design of IMF conditionality and the implementation of
conditionality has been increasingly recognized in the literature as an explanation for the
poor outcomes associated with IMF borrowers.136 However, much of the empirical
literature on IMF austerity has been constrained to using rather blunt measures: being
under an IMF program (0/1), the number of conditions, time under IMF lending, or
drawing on loan disbursements. These measures are much too coarse to capture the true
variation in IMF agreements. These agreements can vary widely; some agreements carry
reforms for every aspect of governance while others only affect a few areas of policy. 137
Some reforms require the passage of legislation while others simply call for the collection
of data, publishing reports, or drafting plans for future changes. Finally, some borrowers
actually implement the reforms attached to IMF loans while others do not. All three of
these generate significant variation in the consequences of IMF lending. Past work tends
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In the 21st century this is sometimes referred to as the post-Washington Consensus.
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See Stiglitz 2002
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See Dreher 2006, Jensen 2007
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See Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009; Stone 2008
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to explain how these sources of variation might affect outcomes of interest, but then use
blunt measures which capture none of this variation.
If the IMF operated as a purely technocratic organization, and countries were left
to implement the policies with no interference from powerful IMF member countries, the
IMF should generate economic recovery. 138 Unfortunately, IMF programs have
consistently failed to promote economic recovery. 139 The debate over why IMF programs
are failing can be can be simplified to (1) too much compliance or (2) not enough
compliance. I call those who blame high levels of compliance policy critics because they
believe austerity policies are to blame. Those who adhere to the second explanation I call
institutional critics because they believe the IMF as an International Organization is
doing a poor job of ensuring compliance with the difficult but necessary economic
reforms.
If the problem is that austerity leads to conflict and harms human rights, then
compliance with reforms is responsible for negative outcomes. If, on the other hand,
countries are not implementing reforms due to political interference, adverse selection,
and moral hazard then studies tying poor outcomes to IMF austerity are misplaced.
Instead, the poor outcomes are the result of countries not enacting reforms. One reason to
believe that low-compliance may be causing conflict recently is that the IMF has
reformed program lending in the 21 st century. Just because past IMF agreements were
harmful does not mean they still are. In order to determine which of these explanations is
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See Stone 2008, 2011; Bas and Stone 2014;
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See Dreher 2009
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correct, we must be able to measure and test the direct effect of compliance on outcomes
of interest.
Twenty-first century IMF loans vary quite a bit. First, compliance with
conditionality ranges from 0% (Tunisia’s Standby Agreement in 2013) to 100%
(Guatemala’s Standby Agreement in 2010) with most countries implementing around
39% of the agreed upon conditions in any given year. Put simply, collective violence in
countries that implement 0% of policies cannot be caused by austerity because austerity
was not imposed.
In addition, there are many different types of IMF loans: Extended Credit Facility,
Exogenous Shocks Facility, Precautionary Credit Line, Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility, Extended Fund Facility, Policy Support Instrument, Standby Agreement, and the
Standby Credit Facility. Some of these are designed to reduce poverty and ensure social
protections remain which sounds quite different from the austerity described by critics of
the IMF. In addition, other loans are taken out as a precaution and carry few conditions.
Both of these distinctions imply that some types of loans are less severe than others.
Finally, some countries take out multiple IMF loans back to back (for example,
Greece) while others take out only a single loan. Citizens in the first group of countries
may become disillusion with austerity and angry that it has not led to growth. This has
the potential to generate violent protest every time a new loan is taken out or new policies
are announced/implemented. Citizens in the second group of countries may protest
austerity in the beginning but settle down over time because when the loan ends life
returns to normal. In this way, the amount of time a country spends under IMF lending
can have a large impact on collective violence.
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The variation in compliance with austerity, the type of IMF loans, and the time
under IMF lending may help explain variation in conflict outcomes among IMF
borrowers. This paper tests whether these three mechanisms can explain variation in
violent protest between borrowers and within borrowers over time. If institutional critics
are correct, then austerity itself is not to blame for collective violence; had countries
implemented more policies then things would have been better. On the other hand, if the
policy critics are correct, then higher compliance should lead to an increase in collective
violence.
IMF Generated Grievances and Collective Violence
Collective violence often gets the attention of the state better than non-violence.140
The destruction of property and use of violence sends signals about how intense citizen
demands are, which also attracts media attention. The strategic use of violence has
benefits even if in the long run non-violent movements may be more successful at
achieving their aims. 141, 142 The use of violence runs the risk of activating emotional
responses that ignore strategic intent. 143 Emotions are often ignored in the social sciences
even though grievance theory builds upon anger, injustice, and fairness as emotions
which lend themselves to mobilization. In truth, both the strategic use of violence and the
unplanned spontaneous eruption of violence are hard to disentangle. I do not disentangle
this relationship here either, but instead argue that IMF austerity makes violence more
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likely either as a strategic decision or as an emotional response to human rights
violations.
Grievance theories tying IMF austerity to collective violence are common in both
the literature and news accounts of IMF protests. 144, 145 By design, IMF austerity places
the costs of reform on the poor, workers, and other vulnerable groups in society. 146 Past
work ties IMF lending to the violation of women’s rights; 147 declining health
outcomes;148 economic rights’ violations;149 reduced social spending;150 and increased
poverty and inequality. 151 There is also a large literature tying IMF austerity to
deteriorating labor conditions such as: declining union participation, 152 lower wages,153
less government respect for worker rights,154 and increased violations of overall labor
rights in law and practice.155
These undesirable effects are argued to be a short-term affair that governments
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can reverse once the economy improves; unfortunately, this is seldom the case in
practice. The grievances that result from reform are deeply felt. Many citizens lose their
livelihoods and ability to support their families while being pushed into poverty. Others
slip through without becoming impoverished, but lose their entire savings. In this way,
the extent of these grievances leaves citizens with much more to lose from not speaking
up. When ignored or repressed, these grievances have the potential to generate
widespread violence. Violence may be an emotional response as citizens feel there are no
lawful avenues through which they can seek redress, or a tactic meant to force the
government to respond to the aggrieved. The underlying commonality here is that IMF
austerity creates conditions in which collective violence is more likely.
Empirical evidence often finds that IMF programs not only fail to promote
economic growth but may actually hinder growth. 156 The violation of economic rights
and a slowdown of economic recovery creates a feeling of relative deprivation. Austerity
reforms make things worse than had the country not chosen austerity. Economic
deprivation has long been theorized to create conflict between dissidents and the state,
and the violation of economic rights has also been tied to conflict onset. 157, 158 Beyond
simply causing hardship (which is always the case during an economic crisis) these
policies are also popularly seen as unfair by the general public.
IMF reforms are unpopular both for the hardships they impose on citizens and for
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their perceived “unfairness.” A 2012 MRB Greek poll found that 90% of Greeks thought
spending cuts were unfair, burdened the poor, and would be accompanied by more
austerity in the future. 159 Fairness plays an important role in grievance theories of
mobilization. In relative deprivation theories, citizens believe they are worse off than they
should be; this inequity is unfair, causes anger, and leads to collective violence. Finally,
behavioral studies show that individuals are willing to pay non-trivial private costs to
punish violations of social norms and perceived unfairness.160
Further, people tend to over-value losses relative to potential gains. 161 In the case
of austerity, potential gains are made in the long run while the costs are borne out heavily
in the short run (j-curve).162 High short-term costs such as cuts to the welfare state
represent very real losses that can push families into poverty. These costs are not
distributed equally which creates a sense of unfairness. The potential benefits of reform
may never arrive if IMF programs do not lead to growth, and citizens have good reason
to doubt whether austerity will ever generate benefits.
The prospect that this time IMF austerity will work when it has failed so many
times before (or is perceived to have failed) is hard for citizens to swallow. Policy
debates in scholarly literature and the media are increasingly skeptical about austerity’s
ability to deliver growth. 163 Plus, while developed countries like the United States
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advocate austerity, they themselves are not willing to use it when faced with economic
trouble. Instead, stimulus packages (expanding the budget as opposed to shrinking it) in
the United States and EU countries are used. Stimulus is not available to IMF borrowers
because austerity is at its core a budget-cutting policy. The combination of economic
hardship and perceived injustice allows citizens to overcome collective action problems
and engage in collective violence.
Theoretical work on grievance and conflict onset is large and often ties anger at
real and perceived injustice to violence. 164 However, the empirical literature has found
little support for grievance theories of conflict, favoring theories of greed instead. This
may be due to problems of measurement though. Most of the measures used (the gini
index or ethnic fractionalization, for example) are chosen for their availability rather than
their validity, and invalid measures could be responsible for null findings. If this is the
case, then further empirical work with better measures is necessary. 165
In addition, the focus on the individual (i.e. rationalist choice theories) can be
problematic for understanding collective violence. Group inequalities can be more
relevant than individual inequalities suggesting that a more refined and valid measure of
economic inequity is necessary. Indeed, scholars have found a strong empirical
relationship between group-level economic inequality and conflict. 166 This appears to be
especially true during times of macroeconomic trouble where scholars have found that
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overcoming collective actions problems is easier. 167
This paper agrees that IMF austerity generates grievances. It is widely agreed that
IMF programs are unpopular and the literature tying them to economic deprivation (such
as inequality, poverty, declining labor rights, increased violations of economic rights)
comes as close to a consensus as exists in political science. The IMF creates a focal point
for the losers to rally around, and austerity, by definition, comes during times of crisis
when it is easier to overcome collective action problems. All of this works to make IMF
austerity a catalyst for collective violence, but not all austerity is the same.
Design
IMF austerity varies in design, level of compliance, and time under. IMF
conditionality is designed to consider a country’s capacity for reform, the political
environment, and requires explicit agreement from a country’s leader. The resulting
austerity forms an international agreement to reform a country’s economy in exchange
for a loan. However, both the extent of the crisis and the type of loan vary. For example,
some IMF programs have been designed to reduce poverty and ensure social protections
remain (especially those associated with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust). Some
loans are short term (Standby Arrangements typically last 1 to 2 years) while others are
designed to last for a longer period (Extended Fund Facility loans are usually 3 or 4
years). Some loans are concessional (Extended Credit Facility), others are not (Standby
Agreements). Finally, some are designed specifically to help low-income countries
(Extended Credit Facility), while others are precautionary (Precautionary Credit Line).
All of this variation in loan type should have different consequences for the grievances
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created, and therefore for collective violence. A paucity of data in the past makes this the
first work to analyze the relationship between different types of loans and collective
violence.
Loans which aim to reduce poverty and protect social welfare provisions will
generate fewer grievances. If these loans do promote pro-poor growth, then the negative
consequences of IMF austerity should be less severe. While the IMF has not taken steps
to incorporate human rights into its lending, loans which are aimed at alleviating poverty
are an attempt to reconcile IMF austerity with the need to protect vulnerable groups in
society which suggests that concessional lending under the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust should lead to less violence than other lending instruments. If true, then this
would provide evidence that the IMF can tailor some loans in ways that reduce their
effects on vulnerable populations and minimize economic rights violations.
Next, loans that are taken out as a precaution tend to have fewer conditions
attached to them. These loans can also be described as less severe as they tend require
less on the part of the state. This is only possible because the IMF is acting preventively
rather than trying to correct a deep structural fault which has caused a crisis. The
distinction between preventive and corrective reform has been held up as evidence of
IMF lending restructuring in the 21st century. However, many remain skeptical arguing
that the underlying agreements themselves have changed very little and this is simply
rhetoric to cover up for the failure of austerity as a reform package. 168 If critics are right
that IMF austerity is the same regardless of the type of loan, then loan type should have
no effect on conflict because all loans are the same. I test this critique with Hypothesis 1.
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H1: Stricter IMF loan conditionality causes more collective
violence than flexible IMF loan conditionality
Compliance
In addition to loan type differences, compliance with IMF austerity also varies
widely. It has long been recognized that while leaders agree to implement IMF austerity
they rarely follow through on this commitment. Compliance with IMF lending is
notoriously low: between 2002 and 2014 the average level of compliance is 39%, and this
pattern is not new. 169, 170 Previous work simply assumes whether or not leaders have
implemented reforms, but it is vitally important to know the actual level of compliance. If
reforms are not being made, then they cannot be responsible for any outcomes: positive
or negative. Non-compliance suggests that outcomes of interest are generated by some
other factor. In this way, the actual level of compliance with reforms may be the single
most important determinant of whether austerity generates conflict. This paper uses a
new measure of compliance taken from the SCIP dataset to directly test if and how
compliance affects collective violence.
Grievance theory suggests that greater levels of compliance should generate more
grievances. Since greater compliance is associated with more reforms which affects a
larger share of citizens, as compliance with IMF austerity increases we should also see a
rise in violence. The reverse side of this is that if compliance decreases we should see a
decline in violence because there are fewer grievances generated. Less compliance might
also be viewed as accommodation to aggrieved citizen’s demands. This suggests a second
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hypothesis where IMF austerity refers to the actual implementation of austerity policies:
H2: As compliance with IMF conditionality increases
collective violence also increases
Time
Finally, the amount of time a country spends under IMF austerity is also
important for explaining levels of collective violence. While under IMF austerity, the
political opportunity for mobilization against the government changes. 171 While all
societies have inequities, individuals rarely mobilize to overthrow or change the regime.
Most economic policies create winners and losers, yet the losers rarely have the ability to
organize. This is why we do not see the poor always engaging in violent collective action.
Before participating in collective violence, individuals first weigh the costs and potential
benefits. The costs and benefits depend on the probability of policy concessions versus
probability of punishment. These probabilities are made up of a variety of other factors,
like the likelihood others join in, the private spoils to be won, possible international
attention garnered by the movement, and the strength of the state.
Put very simply, individuals engage in dissent when they stand to gain more from
it than they risk losing. Political opportunity is one way to think about the variations in
these costs and benefits. When the benefits outweigh the costs, political opportunity is
high, but when the costs outweigh the benefits, then political opportunity is low. This
framework explains both the decision to rebel and the decision to protest. 172, 173
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IMF austerity creates the grievances necessary for collective violence, but when
should we expect this violence to take place? In the Greek case, violent opposition was
strong at the start of IMF austerity but waned in the years after before picking up again.
Cycles of violence are well established in the conflict literature. 174 Once violence
emerges it is hard to break the cycle. Violent protest may lead to repression by state
agents which creates grievances generating new acts of violence.175 This paper argues
that violent protests under IMF austerity follow what Tarrow (1993, 2011) calls protest
cycles.176 That is, protest movements tend to have a cyclical relationship with time.
Collective violence is not constant throughout the course of an IMF program.
There are several reasons for this. First, uncertainty about compliance, and state
incentives to comply with reforms, are largest at the start of an IMF program but become
more certain as time passes. Second, actors who protest violently adopt more effective
strategies for mobilizing over time. Third, the effects of IMF austerity and decisions to
sign up for subsequent loans provide new focal points for dissent and opportunities to try
to alter state behavior. Collective violence is also likely to be met with repression which
generates new grievances sparking further violence.
Violent protest should be largest at the start of an IMF program. The
announcement of austerity triggers a popular backlash as citizens and civil society groups
push back against reforms that are likely to hurt them. 177 Plus, at the beginning everyone
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(citizens, market actors, and the IMF) is uncertain about whether leaders will comply
with reforms or not, and since compliance is often low, domestic groups have incentives
to try to force leaders not to enact reforms which may harm them. 178, 179 Protestors draw
on past experiences under austerity, the experience of other countries under austerity, and
cues from elites who explain how these policies will negatively impact them and whether
there are alternatives (like stimulus). Violence may emerge spontaneously in response to
state behavior (i.e. police repression or harassment) or as a function of how much
individuals have lost or will lose in the near future. Others may purposefully plan to use
violence during protests believing that this will further their cause.
Over time, as the level of austerity becomes known and protester fatigue sets in
there will be a decline in violent protests. Decisions regarding how much a leader will
comply tend to settle into equilibrium. For example, Greece saw low compliance in the
first year of its loan (around 21%) in subsequent years the level of compliance remained
largely the same (hovering between 44% and 52% over the next five years). Protester
fatigue occurs as a result of leader responses to protests (it seems hopeless so people give
up) and as a natural consequence of the time and effort it takes to protest. Work, family,
and social obligations all make protesting a costly endeavor. Violent protest all the more
so since individuals risk being arrested or worse. Eventually individuals find new work or
accept the changes/promises that have been made, yet grievances remain.
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Although violent protests diminish in the years after an IMF program begins, it
often resurges over time. The loose collective of organizations and individuals protesting
austerity becomes more professional over time. These organizations band together and
strategies for confronting the state and expressing grievances become more complex. One
way this violence resurges is when the effects of austerity accumulate. Over time as more
austerity policies are implemented grievances grow. 180 Protests may also resurface when
leaders sign up for a second or third loan, and it becomes increasingly clear that austerity
has not promoted growth and will continue to undermine economic rights. These events
create focal points for new acts of collective violence and may trigger a resurgence of
violent protest. If governments choose to repress or ignore these grievances, this can
produce even more violence. Ignoring grievances can cause citizens to choose violence as
a way to force the government to accommodate. The use of repression may lead to an
increase in violence by the aggrieved.181 Government promises to address grievances may
also fall short. In Greece, Syriza came to power in 2015 with a far-left agenda and an
adamantly anti-IMF mandate which decreased violent protests, but when the party
eventually caved and agreed to more austerity, violent protests surged again.
Altogether, this process suggests that the relationship between IMF austerity and
violent protest is cyclical. Violent protest is large at the start of an IMF program,
diminishes in subsequent years, rises again, and diminishes again. How the government
responds to protests has a large impact on whether violent protests end (if protester
demands are met, promises made, or a leader is replaced) or escalate. On average this
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cyclical pattern may help explain violent protest variation within countries. While
individuals may deviate, countries that get trapped in an endless IMF cycle are subject to
continued cycles of violence.
This cycle explains the variation in Greek protests quite well. Greece saw 37
violent protests between 2010 and 2012. In the next two years there were only five
violent protests though this number rose once again to 8 violent protests in 2015 and
continued increasing in 2016. Greece saw waves of violent protest that ebbed and flowed
in the ways described above. 182
H3: Acts of collective violence follow a cyclical
relationship with the time a country spends under IMF
lending
The preceding hypotheses suggest three different explanation about whether IMF
lending will generate violence. The type of loan, compliance with lending decisions, and
the time a country spends under IMF lending. The next section discusses research design
used to test whether there is empirical support for these mechanisms.
Research Design
There are a number of challenges to empirically testing the relationship between
IMF austerity and collective violence. This paper advances the empirical literature on
IMF austerity and conflict by offering a new dataset that provides much more detail about
IMF lending including a direct measure of compliance. This new measure of compliance
alleviates the issues of adverse selection and measurement that typically hinder research
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on IMF lending.183 Further, even if adverse selection does occur it would result in low
values on compliance.
Unfortunately, a number of additional challenges remain. First, countries only
sign up for IMF lending when they face economic trouble, and it does not make sense to
compare healthy economies with those in crisis. Second, IMF borrowers are a nonrandom sample of countries. Besides economic crisis, the literature has pointed towards a
number of political and economic institutions which both make the IMF more likely to
extend funds and countries more likely to ask for funds.184 Third, much of the literature
has paid scant attention to the appropriate comparison group. 185 One comparison is
between IMF borrowers and non-borrowers. This comparison tells us whether a country
is worse off under IMF austerity than it would have been without the IMF. Controlling
for economic crisis, do countries which reform under the IMF see more conflict than
those which do not? An alternative comparison is between IMF borrowers. This does not
allow for comparison to non-IMF countries, but does allow for a more direct test of how
different loans types and different levels of compliance among IMF borrowers affects
violence. If a country had implemented another 20% of conditions, would that lead to
more violence or less violence? Here, I opt for the second comparison group. Given that
compliance data is missing for non-IMF borrowers this allows for the most direct test of
the hypotheses outlined above.
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This paper uses a sample that consists of only IMF borrowers. This significantly
reduces the sample size, but has the benefit of directly comparing IMF borrowers with
other IMF borrowers. This sample provides answers to the questions of what would have
happened had a country had a different loan type, implemented a greater/lesser number of
austerity conditions, or was under IMF austerity for a longer time-period rather than the
answer to what would happen if the country was not under IMF lending at all. With this
sample, selection into an IMF program can be set aside although this sample choice does
diminish the ability to generalize the findings outside of IMF borrowers. 186 Finally, this
choice of sample also avoids coding the implementation of austerity policies as 0% for
non-borrowers which is not accurate as non-IMF countries did not have the chance to
implement any reforms.
The models below explore IMF austerity between 2002 and 2014. The sample
consists of 78 IMF borrowers. The unit of analysis is country-year. Negative binomial
models are used as they are designed to address count data that has a large number of
zero’s and is over-dispersed.187 Finally, all control variables are lagged one year to ensure
proper order of causality.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in all models is the number of violent protests in a
country-year. Violent protest often precedes more extreme instances of collective
violence such as terrorism or rebellion. Violent protests get the attention of media and
often force the state to respond either by using force itself (repress) or accommodating

186

Oatley 2004

187

See Cameron and Trivedi 2013; King 1998, p.126

112

protester demands. These protests damage property, injure lives, and may scare away
investors which IMF borrowers are hoping to lure in. 188 Violent protest therefore captures
the first stages of collective violence that may occur in response to austerity. From a
policy perspective, explaining what it is about IMF lending that generates violent protest
is necessary for reforming IMF program lending.
The number of violent protest in a year comes from the Mass Mobilization dataset
developed by Regan and Clark (2016) of which the author helped collect and code.
Protests are coded out of newspapers and newswires using LexisNexis. A protest is
defined as a gathering of 50 or more individuals who collectively make a demand of the
government. The demand must address state policy or be targeted at the state or its
agents. This excludes protests against the IMF within a state that do not make an explicit
demand of the government. Violent protests are those in which protesters engage in
violence against the state, property, or other citizens. This measure has the advantage of
capturing cases of collective violence aimed at the state rather than international
organizations, other states, or other domestic groups. This variable captures a sample of
protest events rather than the universe of cases. The dependent variable is a count
measure with a mode of 0 and fits a poisson distribution with over dispersion as it is
heavily skewed to the right and has an excess of zeroes.
Independent Variables
The first set of independent variables are taken from the State-level Compliance
with IMF Programs dataset (SCIP) developed by the author. This dataset codes
compliance with IMF lending at the country-year level between 2002 and 2014. Data is
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coded out of the IMF MONA database and includes over 34,000 condition evaluations by
the IMF executive board. The dataset also provides information on the type of loan that a
country takes out, the size of the loan, and whether loans were precautionary.
In order to evaluate hypothesis 1 a dichotomous variable concessional is used.
This variable is coded 1 if the IMF lending instrument was concessional and 0 if it was
not. Concessional lending refers to IMF instruments which offer interest rates that are
below market value and/or offer a longer repayment period. Concessional instruments
include: Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), Extended Credit Facility
(ECD), Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), and Standby Credit Facility (SCF). These
loans are given out under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and aimed at lowincome countries. They differ from non-concessional loans in the addition of poverty
reduction conditions and floors on social spending. Non-concessional loans include:
Standby Agreements (SBA), Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Precautionary Credit Line
(PCL), and the Policy Support Instrument (PSI). According to the theory, concessional
loans should produce fewer acts of collective violence because they are designed to
reduce poverty and protect vulnerable groups. The conditionality attached to these loans
should therefore be less stringent.
A second dichotomous measure looks at whether an IMF loan was precautionary.
Precautionary loans tend to encompass less harsh austerity because the extent of the
economic crisis is not as bad. These loans are often taken out as insurance and, as a
result, tend to have fewer conditions attached to them. This suggests that precautionary
loans should generate fewer acts of collective violence. Both precautionary and
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concessional lending are argued to be less strict than non-concessional lending, therefore,
the coefficients on these variables should be negative.
Hypothesis 2 is tested using a measure of IMF austerity implementation. This
variable measures the proportion of IMF conditions that have been met in a country-year.
It is coded as the number of conditions met divided by the total number of conditions that
were evaluated in a year by the IMF Executive Board. This variable ranges between 0%
and 100% of conditions met with a sample mean of 40% among IMF borrowers. I expect
the coefficient on IMF compliance to be negative. It is coded from 0 to 1 with 0
representing 0% of conditions met and 1 representing 100% of conditions met.
Finally, the third hypothesis argues that there is a cyclical relationship between
time under IMF austerity and collective violence. I use a cubic polynomial of time under
IMF lending to test this hypothesis. In all, this specification adds three variables: IMF
years, IMF years2, and IMF years3. Time under IMF lending refers to the number of
continuous years a country has spent under IMF lending since 2002.
Control Variables
The number of violent protests in the last year is included as a control variable.
Violent protest tends to be a dynamic process that builds upon past success and failures.
Often, once violence breaks out it can spread and expand. The number of non-violent
protests in the last year is also included as a control variable. Where protest is more
common, we should see a rise in violent protest.189 Whenever there are non-violent
protests there is the potential for them to spiral into violent protest as all protest involves
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some form of confrontation between protesters and police. Both of these variables are
taken from the Mass Mobilization protest dataset.
Next, regime type may affect both the decision to implement reforms and the
amount of violent protests in a year. 190 Democratic countries tend to incorporate the right
to protest, have a free press, and have greater accountability which gives protesters other
avenues for expressing grievances (such as elections) and decreases the likelihood of
protests turning violent. To control for regime type, I include the polity2 ordinal scale
from the Polity IV dataset. It ranges from -10 to 10 with higher values indicating a more
democratic country.
I also control for the logged values of total population and GDP per capita. More
populous countries tend to have more violence because there are more citizens to engage
in confrontations with the state. Wealthier countries tend to have fewer violent protests as
stronger states are able to buy off dissidents, credibly threaten to repress, and provide
citizens with a higher standard of living (reducing the number of things to protest
over).191
Repression of dissidents also effects the level of political violence. It can increase
political violence by creating new grievances or reduce violence by increasing the cost of
dissent.192 For this reason, I include a measure of protester repression coded out of the
Mass Mobilization dataset. This allows me to control for protests which might arise from
the repression of past protests. The included variable is an additive index of the number
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of times state agents used repressive tactics (arrests, beatings, shooting, killings, and
crowd dispersal) against protestors in the last year. This count may exceed the number of
protests if state agents used multiple types of repression against protesters. For example,
a single protest might see police beat protesters, arrest them, and shoot them. The number
of repressive events would be coded as 3 while the number of protests is coded as 1. In
general protests which see multiple forms of repression tend to capture more intense acts
of repression. I expect that when protesters in the previous year are repressed we are
more likely to see an increase in violent protest this year.
A Note on Selection
Controlling for the probability of exit alleviates issues of non-random sample
selection as the decision to exit an IMF program is based on similar factors as the
decision to enter one. 193 To control for this, I design a logistic regression model
predicting early exit from IMF lending. The decision to end an IMF program early is a
function of: economic conditions, the willingness of the IMF to lend, and political
considerations. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if an IMF program ended earlier
than it was scheduled (both in the original agreement and in revisions of that agreement)
and 0 if it did not end early in a given year. Early exit is a function of economic health
(current account balance, inflation, GDP growth, and overall wealth), political
considerations (regime type), and the willingness of the IMF to continue lending (the
number of IMF borrowers, US economic aid), as well as yearly fixed effects which
capture variation in IMF funding and external shocks (such as the global recession). The
predicted values of this equation are then included as a control variable to capture both
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selection into an IMF program and the probability that a country ends an IMF program
early. This equation and a discussion of the model specification can be found in
Appendix B.
Results
Table 1 shows the results for four negative binomial regressions. The first three
models test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 respectively; the fourth model tests these hypotheses
jointly. The control variables behave similarly in all of the models. Countries with large
populations tend to see more violent protests.194 Similarly, when governments have
repressed protesters in the past there is an increase in violent protest. This matches past
research which suggests that repression can create new grievances. 195 Although caution
should be taken as the relationship between repression and protest is dynamic and
complex. Countries which had more violent protests in the previous year tend to have
more protests in the current year. This is consistent with work showing that conflict is
contagious. Finally, as the probability of exit increases countries tend to see more violent
protests suggesting that as the economy recovers citizens may punish leaders who remain
under IMF lending.
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Table 1. Negative Binomial Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
D.V. Violent Protest Count
Precautionary loan
Concessional loan

-0.729**
(0.332)
0.256
(0.205)

IMF compliance

0.732*
(0.386)

IMF years

-0.388*
(0.228)
IMF years^2
0.087**
(0.039)
IMF years^3
-0.005**
(0.002)
Democracy
-0.002
-0.012
-0.015
(0.022)
(0.021)
(0.022)
Population (logged)
0.343*** 0.303*** 0.334***
(0.081)
(0.077)
(0.079)
GDP per capita (logged)
0.031
-0.016
-0.017
(0.094)
(0.080)
(0.081)
Repression
0.058** 0.068*** 0.067***
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.024)
Probability of IMF exit
1.707*
1.194
1.883*
(0.955)
(0.953)
(1.004)
Non-violent protest
0.020
0.017
0.014
(0.022)
(0.022)
(0.022)
Lagged DV
0.127** 0.132** 0.141***
(0.054)
(0.054)
(0.053)
Constant
-6.529*** -5.632*** -5.592***
(1.667)
(1.444)
(1.577)
Observations
Number of countries
Alpha

504
78
1.86***

504
78
1.86***

504
78
1.83***

-0.534
(0.337)
0.338
(0.235)
1.164**
(0.514)
-0.819***
(0.295)
0.141***
(0.047)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.015
(0.022)
0.350***
(0.082)
0.079
(0.096)
0.068***
(0.025)
1.679*
(0.981)
0.018
(0.022)
0.103**
(0.052)
-6.204***
(1.702)
504
78
1.69***

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Turning to the independent variables of interest, there is weak support for
hypothesis 1. Concessional loans do not lead to fewer instances of violent protest than
non-concessional loans in Model 1 or Model 4. This suggests that leaders are either
avoiding implementing the conditions which protect the poor and social welfare spending
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or that these conditions, when implemented, are not effective in alleviating grievances
relative to other types of IMF loans. Precautionary loans are associated with less violence
in Model 1, but are not statistically different from zero in Model 4. Precautionary loans
tend to come with fewer conditions. However, once the level of implementation and the
time under lending are controlled for, these loans do not lead to fewer violent protests. I
therefore find little support for Hypothesis 1.

Models 2 and 4 show the effect of IMF compliance on violent protest. In both
models as IMF compliance increases so do the number of violent protests. These results
are significant at the 90% level in Model 2 and the 95% level in Model 4 providing
support for Hypothesis 2. When leaders implement reforms, it generates grievances
which increases violent protest. In Figure 1 above I plot out-of-sample predictions for
IMF compliance in Model 4. All of the other regressors are held at their median values,
and a set of predictions are created at each level of IMF compliance starting at 0% and
ending at 100%. These predictions are then plotted with 95% confidence intervals. The x120

axis for this graph represents the different levels of IMF compliance while the y-axis
shows the predicted number of violent protests.
Figure 1 shows that there is a clear positive slope between the predicted number
of violent protests and the level of compliance. The confidence intervals around these
predictions are fairly tight at lower levels of compliance. At higher levels of compliance
there is greater uncertainty surrounding these predictions because fewer countries
implement a large percentage of conditions. When countries implement 0% of the
conditions in an IMF loan they see 0.3 violent protests on average. This number increases
to 1 violent protest when 100% of conditions are met. On average a country implements
40% of IMF conditions which translates to an additional 0.2 violent protests in a year
compared to what they would have seen with no implementation. This number increases
to an additional 0.7 violent protests if a country were to implement all of the conditions in
a given year. It is worth noting that the average number of violent protests in the sample
is 1. While this may seem a modest increase, it is still substantively significant given
how rare violent protests are.
Finally, Models 3 and 4 explore the effect of time under IMF lending and violent
protest. This relationship is cubic. Violent protests are decreasing, then increasing, then
decreasing again. It is important to note that these variables are both individually and
jointly significant.196 These results provide support for Hypothesis 3. Figure 2 below
plots the out-of-sample predictions for Model 4. As above, all other regressors are held at
their median value and predictions are generated for the IMF year variables over their full
range of values. The graph shows the expected cubic relationship. Protests are largest at

196

Chi-square = 9.83**
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the start of an IMF program, they decline over the next three years (roughly the amount
of time of an Extended Fund Facility loan), then violence increases over the next five
years before declining once again. The confidence intervals are wide, but this is likely a
function of the small sample size, the use of maximum likelihood, and the short number
of years. Given these limitations the findings in this graph are more than encouraging and
show support for hypothesis 3.

Robustness Checks
Appendix B includes a number of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses.
These models use many different model specifications including: bootstrapped standard
errors, fixed-effects, adding a variable for time (year) to account for changes in protest
patterns over time, non-OECD sample, and a battery of alternative controls. Appendix B
also includes the logistic regression equation for the probability of IMF exit. The results
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remain largely unchanged. There is strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 and very little
support for Hypothesis 1.
Discussion
This paper has broken down IMF austerity into a number of different parts: types
of loans, time under austerity, and compliance with austerity. The findings suggest that
higher compliance with IMF agreements causes an increase in violent protest. Further,
countries see violence at the start of IMF lending and although this violence diminishes in
subsequent years if governments take out new loans and continue to stay under program
lending this violence re-emerges. This paper suggests that the policies attached to IMF
lending promote instability in borrower countries. While there may be additional
criticisms of IMF program lending this paper shows that the when governments follow
through on agreements with the IMF they are more likely to see violent protesters in the
street.
On September 21st, 2017 United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres
alongside President Jim Yong Kim of the World Bank Group called for stronger
international effort to prevent conflict. They argue that while leaders have a role to play
so do international institutions. International Organizations have to take a careful look at
their mandate. The results in this paper suggest that the IMF is contributing to conflict in
governments it lends to. Unless it incorporates human rights protections and ties the
disbursement of loans to those protections this is unlikely to change. International
Organizations more broadly should investigate the human rights and conflict
consequences of their actions. Unless the protection of human rights (including economic
rights) are built into international agreements conflict likely to continue.
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The findings here help resolve a critical debate in the IMF literature: why do IMF
programs have negative outcomes? Critics of the IMF have long pointed to the hardships
that austerity imposes on citizens. These findings have often been challenged because
they depend on compliance with conditionality, but compliance is notoriously low. The
findings here suggest that austerity policies generate more violence even when
compliance is low. This provides support for critics of the IMF and suggests that while
adverse selection and political interference may make matters worse, it is the policies
themselves that generate violence.
This paper is just the tip of the iceberg. There are still a large number of questions
surrounding IMF program lending and conflict that remain unanswered. When do
protests turn violent is it at the start of a loan, when it is announced? Do we see nonviolent protests emerge and turn violent as a response to leader behavior? Does violence
spread from other IMF borrowers with individuals building networks to mount more
effective campaigns of dissent? When leaders respond with repression does dissent
increase? Are some types of conditions more likely to generate violence than other? What
role does violence play in bargaining between leaders and the IMF over the specifics of
conditionality? Does violence lead to early exit from the IMF, leader turnover, or changes
in compliance?
The IMF should worry that program lending generates conflict. Conflict is
increasingly seen as one of the largest impediments to development and so the IMF is
undermining its own efforts. Austerity as a recovery package may cause more harm than
good and the IMF should re-examine other types of reform that cause less hardship on
populations. The findings here suggest that if leaders implemented all of the conditions
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they agreed to there would be a surge in violent protest globally. There is plenty of
evidence that IMF lending was generating violence before. If the IMF truly hopes to
continue as an organization that promotes economic stability it will have to address this
shortcoming. Tweaks to austerity are unlikely to be the answer. Instead the IMF should
turn to human rights led development initiatives if it hopes to promote peace and
development.
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Appendix B - This appendix is meant to provide robustness checks for the main findings
in chapter 2. This is meant to test how sensitive the positive relationship between IMF
compliance and violent protest is, and see if this relationship disappears when using
alternative model specifications or additional control variables. All models use a two-tail
test.

These robustness checks are summarized here:
•

1b. Fixed effects

•

2b. Random effects

•

3b. Including a measure of time

•

4b. Model used to predict the probability of IMF exit

•

5b. Non-OECD sample

•

6b. Non-IMF control variables

•

7b. IMF control variables

•

8b. Number of conditions as a control variable

•

9b. Number of conditions as a measure of exposure

•

10b. Bootstrapped standard errors
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Appendix table 1b re-estimates the main model from chapter 2 using fixed effects. This
helps analyze the effect of IMF variables on changes within a country over time. It also
controls for country specific factors that are not included in the model as control
variables. The results remain the same. IMF compliance and time under IMF lending
remain significant.
Appendix table 1b. Negative binomial regression
with fixed effects
Precautionary loan

Model 1b
Violent protests
-0.646
(0.443)
-0.316
(0.249)
1.392**
(0.581)
-0.488*
(0.274)
0.087**
(0.042)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.020
(0.039)
0.074
(0.163)
0.261
(0.172)
0.008
(0.017)
-0.074
(0.713)
-0.001
(0.019)
-0.013
(0.035)
-2.817
(3.057)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
Number of countries

429
62
134

Random Effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix model 2b re-estimates the main model from the paper using random effects.
The coefficient for precautionary loans is significant and negative in this model. This
suggests that precautionary loans tend to be associated with fewer instances of violent
protest. This is evidence in favor of hypothesis 1. IMF compliance and time under IMF
lending remain significant as in chapter 2.
Appendix table 2b. Negative binomial regression
with random effects
Precautionary loan

Model 2b
Violent protest
-0.681**
(0.346)
-0.167
(0.223)
1.186**
(0.511)
-0.473*
(0.265)
0.088**
(0.041)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.019
(0.023)
0.328***
(0.087)
0.013
(0.099)
0.030**
(0.012)
-0.310
(0.698)
0.005
(0.019)
0.002
(0.034)
-5.767***
(1.763)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
Number of countries

504
78
135

Fixed Effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix model 3b included a measure of time (year). It is possible that the variables
measuring time under IMF lending are simply mirroring changes in violent protests
trends over time. However, even when controlling time the results are unchanged from
chapter 2.
Appendix table 3b. Negative binomial regression.
Model 3b
Time
Violent protests
Precautionary loan

-0.577
(0.445)
-0.328
(0.250)
1.476**
(0.586)
-0.525*
(0.278)
0.084**
(0.042)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.076*
(0.045)
-0.013
(0.039)
0.093
(0.170)
0.110
(0.194)
0.001
(0.017)
-0.357
(0.719)
-0.000
(0.018)
-0.026
(0.035)
-153.756*
(89.158)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Year
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
Number of countries

429
62
136

Fixed effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix model 4b shows the logistic regression used to generate the probability of IMF
exit included as a control variable.
Appendix table 4b. Logistic regression. Model 4b
Probability of IMF exit
IMF exit
IMF participation (T-1)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
FDI (% of GDP logged)
Trade (% of GDP logged)
US economic aid
Democracy
Number of IMF borrowers
Constant

1.723**
(0.767)
0.006
(0.050)
0.013
(0.023)
0.019
(0.028)
0.322*
(0.181)
0.252
(0.193)
-0.121
(0.181)
1.195**
(0.555)
0.000
(0.000)
0.089
(0.054)
-0.284***
(0.098)
-5.246
(5.698)
YES
462

Year fixed effects
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix model 5b re-estimates the model from chapter 2 on a sample of non-OECD
countries. The results remain robust even with this different and smaller sample.
Appendix table 5b. Negative binomial
Model 5b
regression. Non-OECD sample
Number of violent protests
Precautionary loan

-0.700
(0.448)
-0.430
(0.264)
1.296**
(0.573)
-0.392
(0.290)
0.080*
(0.044)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.019
(0.039)
0.076
(0.159)
0.141
(0.195)
0.014
(0.018)
0.222
(0.763)
0.010
(0.021)
-0.041
(0.041)
-2.228
(3.052)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
405
Number of countries
57
Fixed Effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

138

Appendix model 6b adds a number of non-IMF control variables. These include:
Economic liberalization (taken from the Economic Freedom Index); Unemployment
(from the WDI); independent judiciary (taken from the CIRI dataset); Civil war (taken
from the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset); regular and irregular leader turnover
(taken from the ARCHIGOS dataset); electoral system (taken from the Political
Institutions Database); and worker rights (taken from the CIRI database). Economic
liberalization is used to measure the potential benefits (costs) of IMF program
participation. Unemployment offers another measure of grievance which might generate
violence. Independent judiciary is used to measure whether courts can serve as an
alternative outlet for expressing grievances. Countries under civil war may see fewer
violent protests (as individuals are rebelling) and undermine the capacity to implement
IMF reforms. Leader turnover may generate new protests as elections and leadership
changes are often associated with increases in violence and uncertainty. The electoral
system has an impact on how domestic preferences are translated into incentives for
leaders to respond to dissent. Finally, worker rights represent one measure of the
organizational ability of labor unions which tend to be major opponents of austerity. The
results with all of these control variables remain unchanged. IMF compliance and time
under IMF lending remain statistically significant.

Appendix table 6b. Negative binomial regression.
Model 6b
Non-IMF controls
Violent protests
Precautionary loan

-0.362
(0.472)
-0.382
(0.269)
1.736***

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
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(0.634)
-0.655**
(0.294)
0.106**
(0.044)
-0.005**
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.044)
-0.107
(0.221)
0.065
(0.202)
0.014
(0.017)
0.636**
(0.274)
-0.004
(0.014)
-0.294
(0.192)
0.600**
(0.237)
0.052
(0.188)
-0.403
(0.641)
0.369
(0.734)
0.387
(0.547)
-0.045
(0.239)
-0.071
(0.743)
0.000
(0.021)
-0.021
(0.039)
-2.213
(4.506)

IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Economic liberalization
Unemployment
Independent judiciary
Civil war
Regular leader turnover
Irregular turnover
Assembly elected president
Presidential system
Worker rights
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
378
Number of countries
56
Fixed effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 7b introduces a number of additional IMF controls taken from the SCIP
dataset. These include the size of the IMF loan, the type of loan, and whether a loan
ended early in a particular year. The coefficient for precautionary loans is significant in
this model and negative. This provides support for hypothesis 1. IMF compliance remains
significant as does the cubic time under IMF lending. However IMF years and IMF
years^2 lose significance. This is not too surprising as these variables cut the sample size
and MLE models with small sample sizes bias coefficients towards 0.
Appendix table 7b. Negative binomial regression.
IMF controls
Precautionary loan
Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
IMF loan size (millions of SDRs)
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loan
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan
Standby Arrangement (SBA)
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan
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Model 7b
Violent protests
-1.489**
(0.665)
-0.172
(0.677)
1.504**
(0.671)
-0.512
(0.376)
0.087
(0.054)
-0.004*
(0.002)
0.096
(0.085)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.698
(0.485)
0.658
(1.113)
-0.160
(0.406)
1.282
(0.801)
0.000
(0.000)
2.621**
(1.303)

Program ended early

-0.636
(0.401)
0.003
(0.049)
0.086
(0.214)
0.360
(0.286)
0.003
(0.018)
-0.319
(0.939)
-0.005
(0.020)
-0.014
(0.042)
-3.962
(4.456)

Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
Number of countries
Fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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335
55
YES

Appendix table 8 controls for the number of conditions evaluated in a year by the IMF
Executive Board. This is one measure of the amount of austerity requested. The results
remain largely the same. IMF compliance and the squared and cubic measures of time
under IMF lending remain significant. IMF years loses significance. This is not too
surprising as these variables cut the sample size and MLE models with small sample sizes
bias coefficients towards 0.
Appendix table 8b. Negative binomial regression.
Model 8b
Number of IMF conditions
Violent protests
Precautionary loan

-0.673
(0.446)
-0.335
(0.252)
1.438**
(0.584)
-0.446
(0.285)
0.082*
(0.043)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.021
(0.039)
0.074
(0.163)
0.271
(0.174)
0.008
(0.017)
-0.044
(0.718)
-0.000
(0.019)
-0.016
(0.036)
-2.912
(3.065)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
IMF conditions evaluated
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant
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Observations
Number of countries
Fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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429
62
YES

Appendix table 9b treats the number of conditions as a measure of exposure. The results
remain unchanged. IMF compliance and time under IMF lending remain significant.
Appendix table 9b. Negative binomial regression.
IMF conditions as a measure of exposure
Precautionary loan

Model 9b
Violent protests
-0.002
(0.472)
-0.246
(0.265)
1.912***
(0.657)
-1.716***
(0.317)
0.254***
(0.050)
-0.011***
(0.002)
-0.051
(0.039)
-0.010
(0.161)
0.269
(0.178)
-0.024
(0.020)
-0.489
(0.748)
0.022
(0.020)
-0.032
(0.035)
-3.145
(3.079)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
Number of countries
Fixed effects

429
62
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 10b uses bootstrapped standard errors to account for the imprecise
measurement of IMF compliance and probability of IMF exit. The results are unchanged.
Appendix table 10b.
Bootstrapped standard errors
Precautionary loan

Model 1
Violent protest
-0.681
(0.558)
-0.167
(0.388)
1.186*
(0.708)
-0.473
(0.351)
0.088
(0.055)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.019
(0.035)
0.328***
(0.124)
0.013
(0.170)
0.030*
(0.016)
-0.310
(1.364)
0.005
(0.040)
0.002
(0.082)
-5.767**
(2.465)

Concessional loan
IMF compliance
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Democracy
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Repression
Probability of IMF exit
Non-violent protest
Lagged DV
Constant

Observations
504
Number of countries
78
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

146

Chapter 3: Compliance with IMF Austerity and Repression
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have played a major role in economic
reform since the 1970s. They control considerable resources and use those resources to
shape the economic policies of loan recipients. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
makes the disbursement of loans conditional on the implementation of austerity reforms:
significant cuts to government spending and the promotion of neoliberal economic
reforms. Reforms are meant to correct economic problems and promote growth. Despite
these goals most previous studies conclude that, other things equal, participation in IMF
programs causes dissatisfaction among the citizens, who then resist reforms efforts.
Faced with such resistance, governments often respond by increasing human rights
violations.
Critics of this research program and these research findings often note that
“participation” in an IMF program is not the same as “compliance” with IMF loan
conditions. Few previous studies have measured the degree of compliance with IMF loan
conditions, and no previous large-scale comparative study has examined the relationship
between degree of compliance with loan conditions and the degree of repression of
human rights by the loan recipient country.
This paper explores the relationship between compliance with IMF conditionality
and physical integrity rights between 2002 and 2014. Physical integrity rights refer to the
rights of a country’s population to be free from the state use of torture, disappearances,
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extra judicial killings, and political imprisonment. The violation of physical integrity
rights is called repression, though repression may also take other forms. Previous
research has found IFIs have a detrimental effect on physical integrity rights. 197 However,
these studies have failed to account for compliance with conditionality. Whether or not
reforms are ever implemented has often been assumed away due to data limitations.
Critics of this literature point to low compliance as a source of poor outcomes such as
increased repression. Given that IMF borrowers implement fewer than half of the reforms
they agree to this critique is an important one. Compliance is an integral part to any story
about how IMF austerity policies affect human rights but is missing from empirical
research.
This study advances the literature in two ways. First, this is the first paper to
systematically evaluate how compliance with IMF conditionality affects repression. The
literature on IMF compliance notes that compliance is notoriously low. 198 If countries are
not implementing reforms, then reforms may not be the source of repression. Thus,
without taking compliance into consideration it is difficult to accept the results of past
research tying IMF austerity to repression. Second, this paper tests whether this
relationship holds in the 21st century. Past work has primarily focused on the late 20th
century. The IMF has made significant reforms in the 21 st century in response to criticism
from scholars and policy makers about the negative consequences of program lending.
The effects of IMF lending in the 21 st century may be markedly different from lending in
the 20th century if these reforms were successful. This paper uses a new measure on IMF
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compliance over the period 2002-2014 to test this relationship. Empirical results show
that higher compliance with IMF conditionality leads to greater repression. These
findings suggest that it is austerity policies promoted by the IMF which create conditions
conducive to increased repression.
Causes of Repression
Governments repress in order to control dissent. 199 This paper is concerned with
physical integrity rights violations as a form of repression though this is certainly not the
only form that repression can take. This section outlines some of the research on the
determinants of repression. Scholarly literature suggests that government use of
repression is a function of threat, institutions, and state capacity. The choice of repressive
tactics and the actor responsible for repression also vary depending on the threat and goal
that repression is meant to accomplish.
Whether a country is democratic or not provides one explanation for whether
countries repress their citizens. During the Arab Spring in the Middle East Hosni
Mubarak (Egypt) and Ben Ali (Tunisia) and other autocratic leaders used deadly force
against peaceful protesters calling for political and economic reform. Although
autocracies repress at higher levels than democracies, repression in response to threat
occurs in democracies as well. The repression of the Occupy Wall Street protesters in the
United States or peaceful Greek anti-austerity protesters is consistent with work showing
that repression occurs in response to threat even if a country is democratic. 200
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Democracies have institutions which make repression less likely. Elections
provide an alternative means of expressing dissatisfaction with government policy. 201
Rather than dissenting, individuals can vote a leader out of office and choose another
leader who promises to address grievances. Rule of law which constrains leaders allows
citizens to hold the government and its agents accountable for violations of the law.
Opposition parties provide an additional voice which may take up the issues that citizens
have with their leader and provide them a voice. These institutions make repression less
likely, but when governments are threated they repress, democracy or not. 202 Although
democracies are less likely to repress they also provide freedom of association which
may allow citizens to co-ordinate anti-government activities leading to more threats and
more dissent.203
Although threat increases the probability that governments repress their citizens
the form repression takes can vary significantly. Some governments opt to shut down the
press and access to information critical of the government. In these cases, the government
may target journalists either through intimidation, physical harm, or by killing those who
speak critically of political leaders. 204 The government in Egypt during the Arab Spring
for example shut down social media sites like Twitter and Facebook and the Tunisian
government hacked citizens Facebook accounts and censored web content. Repression
may be overt such as killing opponents or arresting opposition figures. It may also be
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covert as leaders “disappear” those who criticize them and subject dissidents to torture. In
Argentina during the dirty war of the 1970s and early 1980s the military abducted over
30,000 individuals many of which were killed and tortured. Leaders may repress preemptively if the anticipate that citizens are going to engage in some form of dissent. If
leaders expect conflict to spillover from neighboring states or are about to take action
which lead to dissent in the past or in other contexts repression may increase. 205 Leaders
also repress preventively in an attempt to increase the costs of dissent. 206 This may take
the form of expelling journalists or arresting leaders of groups opposed to the
government. The idea here is to weaken the oppositions ability to mobilize and challenge
the government.
Leaders are often credited with the decision to repress. When they are threatened
they tell state agents to repress the opposition, ethnic groups, labor organizers, protesters
or whoever they see as a threat. Alternatively, repression can also occur when leaders
lose control over their agents. 207 Agents who are underpaid may use repression as a
means to supplement their income. The police and military may also sell their allegiance
to elites, businesses, and criminal organizations: for example, police in Mexico who are
in the pocket of drug cartels. Training in human rights and conflict de-escalation may
also help avoid situations which lead to repression. 208 Repression is not always
purposeful but may be an emotional reaction by state agents to provocation from
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dissidents or perceived threats. 209 Repression may also be the result of psychological
biases among state agents who hold biased attitudes towards certain racial, ethnic,
political, or gender groups. 210
The most significant predictor of repression however remains threats to a leader’s
power. Political violence, 211 civil war,212 and political protest all represent threats and as
such have been found to increase repression. 213 Weak states in particular are often unable
to project their power and as such are more likely to see citizens engage in collective
violence.214 As threat increases we are more likely to see violence, but this increase is
filtered through domestic institutions and the capacity of the state.
IMF programs create conditions which make repression more likely for several of
the reasons outlined above. States are weaker under IMF lending as the economy is in
crisis and leaders have fewer resources available to address dissent besides repression.
State agents are disgruntled, underpaid, and act with less oversight increasing agency
loss. Threats to leader power come from both below (citizens) and above (elites). These
mechanisms work to increase the likelihood that IMF borrowers repress their citizens.
The next section outlines this process in more detail.
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Theory
This paper explores how compliance with IMF lending might generate repression.
IMF reforms are unpopular and when governments enact them they face a variety of
threats to their power. Repression occurs in response to this threat. Compliance is
understudied in the IMF and human rights literature in part because there is very little
data measuring it, and the data that does exist is quite blunt.215 The literature on
compliance is unanimous that most countries implement less than half of the conditions
attached to IMF loans. 216 This has made a number of scholars question the findings
between IMF lending and repression. If leaders are not enacting reforms then reforms
cannot be responsible for an increase in repression. Other aspects of IMF lending might
increase repression such as the unpopular nature of the IMF as an institution or the
weakness that leaders convey when taking out a loan.217 In order for austerity reforms to
cause repression they must actually be implemented. Taking a look at how compliance
affects repression and testing whether repression is a function of increased compliance is
a necessary step for the IMF human rights literature to move forward.
Economic crises are a stress factor that makes repression more likely. Whether a
country reforms or not, economic crisis makes a government look weak and incompetent.
Was this crisis the fault of the government? If citizens blame their government for
causing or failing to respond appropriately to an economic crisis then they may seek to
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replace them.218 Taking out a loan with the IMF makes leaders look incompetent. 219
Unable to address economic problems themselves, they must turn to an international
lender for help. While leaders do try and use the IMF as a scapegoat turning to the IMF
looks bad for leaders trying to convey competency. 220 This explains why leaders who
take out IMF loans are often replaced. 221 The decision to turn to the IMF comes with
significant risk to leader tenure. This risk is known, and most leaders avoid turning to the
IMF if they have other options.
The IMF is a lender of last resort which bails out bankrupt (or nearly bankrupt)
states. They provide access to money in exchange for economic reforms. This money can
prevent bankruptcy in the short term and prevent leaders from defaulting on their
international and domestic debts. Signing onto an IMF loan can help leaders credibly
commit to pro-market reforms in the future which can generate investment and trade. 222
Borrowing from the IMF represents a public commitment to pro-market reforms and
there are significant costs to breaking this commitment. 223 This commitment is often seen
as credible since leaders are willing to take on significant domestic costs by signing up
for an IMF program and enacting the prior actions necessary to be approved for a loan.
IMF austerity as a reform strategy hinges on pro-market reforms which shifts power
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away from the state and towards market actors.224 It is popular with businesses and some
elites but unpopular with much of the citizenry who pay the costs of these reforms.
Turning to the IMF then is a choice to promote economic recovery by focusing on trade,
foreign investment, and business development. It is not the only economic recovery
strategy and it comes with significant costs like any reform strategy.
IMF austerity places the burden of reform on citizens and in particular the poor
and workers.225 While leaders bargain with the IMF to minimize the conditions they
anticipate will be the most unpopular the conditionality attached to IMF lending asks
leaders for more reforms and at a more rapid pace than would have happened under
normal policy making. 226, 227 The literature tying IMF reforms to hardships on borrower
populations is massive and quite unanimous that IMF conditionality leads to significant
violations of economic and social rights.228 Citizens bare the cost of reform and these
costs are largest for the poor, women, workers, and vulnerable populations. Austerity
reforms include cuts to public employment, wages, and benefits; social welfare cuts; and
dismantling of labor protections. Budget cuts tend to negatively impact monitoring
agencies tasked with finding and punishing human rights violators. As governments
comply with more of the reforms tasked them by the IMF citizens feel a larger and larger
burden. This burden leads to significant grievances among the population which
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generates collective dissent. 229 Austerity increases repression through its effect on state
agents, collective dissent, and limiting the policy tools available to leaders.
Cuts to police and military budgets often result in decreased employment, wages,
and benefits. This predictably causes grievances among these state agents. These agents
may turn to repression as a way to supplement their income. 230 Alternatively, disgruntled
state agents tasked with containing social unrest may be more likely to respond
emotionally with violence rather than purposefully following order. 231 Fewer state agents
as a result of layoffs or strikes increases the burden on remaining state agents. State
agents tasked with containing dissent with fewer resources and less manpower can make
repressive tactics more likely. State agents are also more likely to encounter collective
dissidents and repression may increase simply as a function of the increased number of
opportunities to repress.
Citizens who are unhappy at being asked to foot the bill for economic reform
often engage in collective dissent in an attempt to halt or reverse such reforms.
Protests,232 riots,233 and rebellion increase under IMF lending. 234 Elites may challenge
leaders who are weak by instigating dissent or directly attempting to overthrow leaders.
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235, 236

Elites who gained rents and exercised power of economic policy under the status

quo may fight reforms which threaten those rents. 237 Leaders under IMF lending face
significant threats from both above and below. These threats are exacerbated by greater
compliance with reforms which produces more grievances, dissent, and change from the
status quo. As the size of these threats increases the use of repression becomes more
likely.
In order to comply with IMF austerity leaders significantly cut their budgets. This
leaves them with fewer tools to quell dissent. IMF reforms in the 21 st century bleed into
all aspects of governance including data collection, bureaucratic structure, and legal
institutions.238 Leaders are double constrained by the amount of reforms they are tasked
with implementing and the need to cut government spending while doing so. Enacting
reforms significantly tasks state capacity as leaders must use significant political capital
to comply with reforms lest they lose funding. Spending is one tool that leaders
traditionally use to quell dissent and buy support, but during IMF lending this tool is for
all intense and purpose taken off the table. 239 Repression under IMF lending is a cheap
tool that can be employed in response to threats. The mechanisms discussed above lead to
the following hypothesis:
H1: As compliance with IMF conditionality increases,
government respect for physical integrity rights decreases
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Compliance or Non-Compliance?
The mechanisms outlined above require the implementation of reforms to operate.
All of these mechanisms translate policy reform into consequences which threaten leader
survival and provoke repression. If leaders are not implementing reforms then they
should feel less threatened (though they may still face some threat due to economic
trouble). This also suggests that high compliance borrowers should be more repressive
than low compliance borrowers. Past research has tended to focus on the relationship
between IMF borrowers and non-IMF borrowers.
Some of the mechanisms tying IMF lending to repression are theorized to operate
with or without compliance. When leaders sign up for an IMF program is can signal
incompetence.240 Unable to address economic crisis leaders have to ask for help from an
International Organization that dictates domestic economic policy. This leads to a loss of
economic sovereignty which elites who stand to lose power and citizens who dislike
international interference in domestic politics often dislike. 241 Signing up for an IMF
program can also be seen as “selling out” to the West or as a new form imperialism
which can be particularly unpopular in some post-colonial countries.242
Compliance theories such as the one outlined above differ in that they suggest that
repression increases only when governments implement reforms. Do the conditions that
the IMF recommends create conditions that increase repression when enacted? By
comparing IMF borrowers, it is possible to distinguish whether repression is the result of
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compliance mechanisms or non-compliance mechanisms. Once this distinction is made
there are reasons to be skeptical about whether compliance generates repression in the
21st century.
Most countries implement very few of the conditions attached to IMF loans.
While systematic data on compliance with conditionality is rare, scholars generally agree
that less than half of conditions are met on average. 243 This paper presents a new measure
of IMF compliance which finds that only 39% of conditions evaluated by the IMF
Executive Board in a year are met by borrower governments between 2002 and 2015.
Low compliance has been argued to be the result of moral hazard, dependence, and
adverse selection. 244 Poor IMF outcomes are also the result of political interference from
member countries which help their allies to avoid the costs of austerity. The United States
for example has been shown to intervene in lending decisions and countries can
sometimes trade political favors for less stringent conditionality. 245, 246 It is possible that
poor outcomes associated with IMF lending are the result of non-compliance. Rather than
the threat-repression linkage outlined above it may be that repressive countries are more
likely to sign up for an IMF loan, not reform and repress their citizens at higher levels
than non-IMF borrowers.
It is also possible that poor outcomes are a thing of the past. The IMF has made
significant reforms to its lending process by streamlining conditionality, adding
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conditions to protect the poor, adding social welfare floors, and removing the aspects of
conditionality that have been criticized the most. 247 For example, structural performance
criteria (often criticized by human rights scholars) have been discontinued since 2009. 248
Although the IMF has not embraced the language of human rights, pro-poor policies can
be seen as an attempt to mitigate the social consequences of lending. These reforms have
accompanied public statements that IMF lending today is completely different than
lending in the past.249 Even if past IMF agreements did create conditions that were
conducive to repression, things in the 21 st century may be quite different. This is
especially true in the last decade.
The 2007 global crisis posed a serious threat to the international economic order.
The post 2007 era presents the best test of the argument above for several reasons. First,
the severity of the global crisis created a situation where IMF member countries were less
likely to interfere politically with lending decisions. Previous research has found that
political interference is minimal when the severity of crises is large. 250 This allowed the
IMF to focus on promoting a stable economic system with less worry about upsetting
member countries. Second, funding for the IMF was tripled in 2009 by the G20
countries.251 The IMF was able to give out significantly more in funds and fund more
countries as a result. This is reflected in the large number of IMF borrowers after the
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crisis (reaching 61 countries in 2010 compared with just 24 in 2002). Loans given out in
the last ten years consist of streamlined conditionality. Publicly the IMF declared that
these loans were designed to mitigate much of the harm that past lending had caused. 252 If
true then IMF lending today may indeed be very different than lending in the pat. The
post 2007 period provides the most stringent test of the theory above. This paper splits
the sample into three categories: 2002-2014, 2002-2008, and 2008-2014. I expect that
compliance will have a negative relationship with respect for physical integrity rights
regardless of the time period looked at. If IMF reforms were successful, this relationship
should disappear in the 2008-2014 period. Given the small sample size this test is biased
against finding a statistically significant relationship in either direction.
Research Design
This study uses cross-sectional time series data measured at the country-year
level. The sample is made up of 74 IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2014. This
represents the full sample of IMF borrowers (93 countries) minus those whose data does
not exist for the control variables. This sample allows for the most direct test of how
compliance affects repression. Issues of non-random selection into IMF programs are
described as a significant empirical impediment in the literature. 253 By directly comparing
all IMF borrowers the issue of selection is held constant. 254 This significantly simplifies
the challenges to empirical evaluation but at the same time limits the sample size to under
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500. This has the potential of downwardly biasing estimates and creating type II errors
(false negatives). 255
Least squares estimators are well suited to address small sample sizes. 256 This
paper uses a generalized least squares regression model with panel corrected standard
errors (PCSE).257 PCSE models are appropriate when the number of units (countries) is
much larger than the number of time periods. The model assumes first order correlation
within panels and uses a first order autoregressive process to control for this.258 Fixed
effects are added to better estimate changes within panels over time. These models also
assume errors are heteroskedastic across panels and contemporaneously correlated.
Finally, I lag all control variables 1 year to minimize the potential for reverse causality.
The second challenge to evaluating the effect of IMF conditionality on outcomes
of interest is the lack of data on compliance. This paper uses a novel measure of IMF
compliance taken from the State-level Compliance with IMF Programs dataset (SCIP).
This dataset codes over 34,000 IMF Executive Board evaluations between 2002 and 2014
for 94 IMF borrowers. Compliance is coded as the percentage of IMF conditions that the
IMF Executive Board evaluated as met in a given year divided by the total number of
conditions evaluated.
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The dependent variable is taken from the CIRI human rights database and recently
updated by the CI-Rights dataset. The Physical Integrity Rights index is a discrete
variable coded from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating greater respect (less repression).
This is an additive index consisting of four ordinal measures of repression: political
imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. The index is coded out
of the U.S. State Department reports on Human Rights and Amnesty International
Reports. Each of these four measures if coded from 0 to 2 with higher values indicating
greater respect for each variable. This is a common indicator used to measure repression
in the human rights literature and past researchers have treated it as continuous.259
The literature on IMF program participation and repression informs the control
variables in the model which might affect both compliance and repression. Past research
has argued that the larger the population of a country the more repression we are likely to
see.260 The model includes a logged measure of country population. State capacity has the
potential to increase compliance and repressive capability. I use logged GDP per capita as
a proxy for state capacity. 261 GDP per capita is a good measure of bureaucratic and
administrative capacity (which might affect compliance) and also captures economic
grievances which might also increase repression. 262 Both of these measures are taken
from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. Regime type has
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See Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009

260

See Henderson 1993

261

See Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hendrix 2013

262

See Hendrix 2010 for an overview of state capacity measures and a discussion of GDP per capita.
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been shown to affect compliance as well as repression.

263, 264

Democracies tend to

repress less than autocratic states. I use the democracy scale (polity2) taken from the
PolityIV dataset coded from -10 to 10 with higher values indicating a more democratic
state. Intra-state conflict has also been tied to an increase in the use of repression and may
limit the ability (or willingness) of states to implement IMF reforms. 265 The model
includes a dichotomous measure of civil conflict coded as 1 if there is any conflict
between the government and a domestic group that leads to at least 25 battle deaths in a
year. This measure is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.
Finally, I include a measure of the probability a country stays under an IMF
program. This issue was outlined by Przeworski and Vreeland (1999) in their work
exploring IMF programs and growth. They argue that the decision to stay under an IMF
program is not random but strategic and one that should be modelled. Researchers have
since focus much more on their discussion of non-random selection into IMF lending
though the decision to leave is especially important for samples consisting of only IMF
lenders. Leaders may choose to exit an IMF program early rather than repress their
citizens or comply with IMF conditions. The ability to exit is therefore an alternative
policy option that most past work has ignored. Building on past work I explore the
decision to remain under IMF lending or exit early. 266
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See Oatley 2004, Vreeland 2006; Dreher 2009
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Poe and Tate 1994; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport 2004
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I build a logistic regression model predicting early exit from IMF lending. Early
exit is taken from the SCIP dataset (see above) and coded as 1 if an IMF arrangement
ended earlier than its original or revised end date. Using logistic regression, I predict
early exit for IMF borrowers as a function of whether a country was under an IMF
program the previous year, a variety of economic indicators (GDP per capita, GDP
growth, current account balance, inflation, FDI, trade), political indicators (US economic
aid, regime type, the number of IMF borrowers, labor rights) and a dummy variable for
each year to capture exogenous shocks such as the global crisis and changes in IMF
funding by member states. The results of this model can be found in the appendix. I add
the predictions from the early exit model as a control in the repression model.
Results
Table 1 (below) shows the results of three models predicting physical integrity
rights as a function of compliance with IMF conditionality. Model 1 estimates this
relationship for the full sample of IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2014. Model 2
explores the 2002-2007 time-period and Model 3 explores the 2008-2014 era when the
world was engulfed in a global economic crisis. The results of the three models are
largely the same. The inclusion of fixed effects dilutes many of the control variables 267
which are largely insignificant with the exception of Model 2. In Model 2 democracies
and wealthier countries tend to have better respect for physical integrity rights which is
consistent with past work.
In every model compliance with IMF conditionality is statistically significant and
in the predicted direction. As countries implement a larger percentage of conditions,

267
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respect for physical integrity rights declines. This effect is substantively quite large. If a
country implemented 100% of the conditions they were tasked with then respect for
physical integrity rights would decline by between 0.57 and 0.7 in a given year. The
largest effect is predicted in the post-2007 era when IMF lending was streamlined and
well-funded despite the smaller sample size. This is further evidence the IMF
conditionality is responsible for repression rather than other factors. These results are
consistent with the causal argument in the paper and provide support for Hypothesis 1.
Table 1. OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Physical Integrity Rights
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
2002-2014 2002-2007 2008-2014
Percent of IMF conditions met
Probability of IMF exit
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil conflict
Constant

Fixed effects
AR1 process w/in panels
Observations
R-squared
Number of countries

-0.649***
(0.195)
0.766
(0.638)
0.140
(0.693)
-0.137
(0.185)
0.061
(0.040)
0.036
(0.164)
4.109
(10.328)

-0.576*
(0.345)
1.607
(1.061)
-1.270
(1.827)
0.496*
(0.290)
0.165***
(0.040)
0.205
(0.212)
21.631
(28.407)

-0.699***
(0.232)
0.751
(0.711)
-0.649
(1.472)
0.782
(0.509)
-0.013
(0.037)
0.034
(0.239)
11.102
(21.869)

YES
YES
429
0.927
74

YES
YES
194
0.952
53

YES
YES
235
0.968
62

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; two-tail test.

About 80% of countries either show no change in physical integrity rights in a
given year or a one-unit change (either positive or negative). The average level of
compliance is around 40% which translates into a decrease of between .23 and .28 within
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a single year. If a country stays under an IMF program for four years (35% of countries
remain under IMF lending for 4 years or more) this translates into about a one unit
decrease in respect for physical integrity rights. This shows strong support for Hypothesis
1 which are substantively meaningful.
Figure 1 below shows out-of-sample predictions for Model 1. All of the control
variables in the model are set to their median value. 268 I then set the fixed effect for
country equal to a country which is very similar to these values. In this case Benin fits
with these median values and is representative of the data in the dataset. 269 I then generate
a prediction at each levels of compliance with conditionality beginning at 0% and
increasing to 100% by one-unit increments. This data does not exist within the sample
(hence the out-of-sample description) but is representative of the data as a whole. I
include 95% confidence intervals around these predictions.

268

Democracy is set at 7, logged population is set at 16.07, logged gdp is set at 7.03, civil conflict is set to
0, and the probability of exit is set to 0.06.
269

Benin went under IMF lending in 2005 and remained under for 10 years. Over the same time period
overall respect for physical integrity rights has declined.
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Figure 1 shows that as the percentage of IMF conditions implemented (x-axis)
increases the predicted level of respect for physical integrity rights (y-axis) decreases.
Moving from implementing 0% of conditions to 100% of conditions in a single year leads
to a decline of physical integrity rights in the order of 0.65 for a single year. The 95%
confidence intervals surrounding these predictions do not overlap indicating that these
results are fairly strong. This graph shows a clear negative relationship between
compliance with IMF conditionality and respect for physical integrity rights.
Robustness Checks
A number of alternative model specifications were used to check how robust the
findings above are. These can be found in Appendix 3 and include: a partial proportional
odds model that treats the DV used above as ordered; the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable, using the change in physical integrity rights rather than the level; using a non168

OECD sample; the inclusion of additional non-IMF controls such as leader turnover,
unemployment, judicial independence and freedom of speech; additional IMF controls
such as loan size, time under lending, and loan type; a negative binomial regression
model with repression measured as the number of repressive acts against protesters (a
new dependent variable); repression of protests controlling for whether there were any
protests to repress; a mediation model predicting violent protest with IMF compliance
and then using violent protest and compliance to predict repression. All of these models
support the argument and hypothesis made above. A number of models were also run
predicting the underlying components of the physical integrity rights and changes in these
underlying components. The results show that IMF compliance increases the use of
political imprisonment and disappearances as well as causing a positive change in the use
of extra-judicial killings. This once again supports the arguments made above though it
does suggest that IMF compliance may increase some types of repression more than
others. There is no evidence that IMF compliance however reduces the use of repression
regardless of how repression is measured here.
Conclusion
This paper argues, and the empirical results show that higher compliance with
IMF conditionality was associated with increased repression by governments. These
findings hold in the 21st century despite reforms that the IMF has made to its lending
practices. These results are strongest in the 2008-2014 period when the IMF had the
greatest funding and support for its mission. This paper speaks to the debate about
whether negative IMF outcomes are the result of adverse selection, dependency, or the
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wrong policies. The findings here show that in the case of repression compliance with the
policies that the IMF recommends are responsible for greater repression.
These findings also lend support to empirical work that has criticized the IMF
but have been unable to measure of test whether policies were being enacted. This
literature is large and ties IMF program participation to declines in labor rights, health
and education, respect for women’s economic rights, and respect for economic rights.
IMF programs are also tied to increased conflict such as protests, riots, and rebellion.
Low compliance has often been pointed to as a reason to be skeptical of these findings.
Low compliance among IMF borrowers is well documented. However, the results here
suggest that even low levels of compliance can generate increased repression. Future
work should re-evaluate the literature in light of new compliance data. If these results
hold despite controlling for compliance or as they do here as a function of compliance
this helps resolve the ongoing debate about why IMF programs have been largely seen as
a failure. While adverse selection and political interference may still occur, austerity
implementation still causes repression. These results also imply that if governments were
to comply more we would see a rise in global repression.
Despite the findings here there are still many questions left unanswered. Future
work may look at whether other kinds of repression also increase such as preventive
repression or pre-emptive repression. Preventive repression – such as curfews, limits on
assembly, restrictions on the press – is often used to undermine mobilization. 270 Preemptive repression occurs when governments repress in the anticipation of dissent. Given
that IMF lending is tied to dissent it would not be surprising to find that leaders engage in

270
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both preventive and pre-emptive repression when taking out a IMF loan, especially if
their neighbors under IMF programs are facing widespread dissent. Do these findings
hold in democratic countries or just non-democratic ones? Although democracies have
institutional constraints built in to prevent repression and channel dissent to other
avenues, the mechanisms outlined in this paper should apply as much to democratic
countries as the do to non-democratic ones.
More generally these findings provide further evidence that International
Organizations such as the IMF can have a large and negative impact on the human rights
conditions of governments. International agreements often call for significant changes to
domestic policy. These changes can have unintended consequences (such as increasing
repression and dissent) that undermine their mission. Both repression and conflict are
obstacles to development. If the IMF and other International Organizations seek to
promote development, then they must incorporate the protection of human rights into
their mandates. They must further tie this protection to the disbursement of benefits and
dolling out of punishment. Where states violate human rights in order to accommodate
international agreements these agreements cannot pretend to adhere to human rights law.
The IMF should be concerned that its lending programs generate repression.
Funder governments should also be concerned that efforts to promote economic recovery
may spark repression and conflict which have the opposite effect. Future work would
benefit from expanding compliance data to the 1990s. It is possible that the reforms that
IMF have made have mitigated some of the negative consequences of austerity. This
would be good news for the IMF if true. However, program lending continues to
undermine human rights respect in the 21 st century. These reforms are clearly not enough
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to address what scholars and borrower governments have been saying for decades. There
is plenty of evidence that this has been occurring for decades and this suggests that the
IMF is either unwilling or does not care to protect human rights.
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Appendix C - This appendix is meant to provide robustness checks for the main findings
in chapter 3. This is meant to test how sensitive the negative relationship between IMF
compliance and repress is, and see if this relationship disappears when using alternative
model specifications or additional control variables. All models use a two-tail test.

These robustness checks are summarized here:
•

1c. Lagged dependent variable

•

2c. Change in repression as the dependent variable

•

3c. Non-OECD sample

•

4c. Repression of protesters as an alternative dependent variable

•

5c. Repression of protesters controlling for selection

•

6c. Non-IMF control variables

•

7c. IMF control variables

•

8c. Mediation model

•

9c. Disaggregating the Physical Integrity Index

179

Appendix table 1c re-estimates the models from the paper and includes a lagged
dependent variable. Model 1c and 3c remain unchanged. However, model 2c loses
significance. This may be due to the low sample size (197 cases). Overall the findings
support the hypothesis made in chapter 3.

Appendix table 1c. OLS with PCSE predicting
physical integrity rights. Lagged DV

Model 1c
2002-2014

Model 2c
2002-2007

Model 3c
2008-2014

Lagged DV

0.218***
(0.060)
1.009
(0.643)
-0.467**
(0.216)
0.449
(0.821)
-0.299
(0.189)
0.069
(0.067)
0.049
(0.175)
-1.321
(12.427)

0.037
(0.081)
1.396
(1.084)
-0.320
(0.314)
-1.195
(2.244)
0.414
(0.335)
0.259***
(0.077)
0.212
(0.257)
19.959
(34.958)

0.126
(0.091)
1.633**
(0.804)
-0.727***
(0.277)
0.559
(1.545)
0.289
(0.560)
-0.064
(0.080)
0.194
(0.292)
-5.335
(22.921)

197
0.854
53
YES

253
0.856
66
YES

Probability of IMF exit
IMF compliance
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of countries
Fixed effects

450
0.817
78
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 2c changes the dependent variable to change in physical integrity rights.
IMF compliance remains significant once again showing support for hypothesis 1.

Appendix table 2c. OLS with PCSE
Model 4c
Change in repression
Change in physical integrity rights
IMF compliance

-0.427*
(0.234)
-1.016
(0.632)
-0.182
(0.844)
0.213
(0.174)
0.049
(0.035)
-0.103
(0.203)
0.694***
(0.056)
-1.466
(12.898)

Probability of IMF exit
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Physical integrity rights
Constant

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared
Fixed effects

491
79
0.383
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 3c looks at the sample of non-OECD countries. IMF compliance remains
significant once again showing support for hypothesis 1.

Appendix table 3c. OLS with PCSE
Non-OECD sample

Model 5c
Physical integrity
rights

IMF compliance

-0.749***
(0.191)
0.949
(0.667)
-0.017
(0.691)
-0.152
(0.180)
0.061
(0.040)
0.014
(0.163)
6.784
(10.329)

Probability of IMF exit
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Constant

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared
Fixed effects
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

182

437
73
0.925
YES

Appendix table 4c uses an alternative measure of repression. This is the number of
repressive acts (crowd dispersal, arrests, beatings, killings, and shootings) used against
protesters in a year. A single protest can include multiple acts of repression and indicates
more aggressive repression. Data on protest repression is taken from the Mass
Mobilization protest database.

Appendix table 4c. Negative binomial regression
Alternative dependent variable

Model 6c
Protest
repression

Lagged DV

0.012
(0.009)
0.722*
(0.387)
0.440
(0.618)
0.055***
(0.004)
0.216***
(0.084)
-0.124
(0.085)
-0.010
(0.022)
0.298
(0.206)
-3.742**
(1.538)

IMF compliance
Probability of IMF exit
Total number of protests
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Constant

Observations
Number of countries
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

183

414
77

Appendix table 5c estimates the same model as appendix model 6c while also accounting
that repression of protesters is censored. Repression of protesters cannot occur unless
there is a protest to repress. One third of years in the IMF only sample have no protests.
This may introduce selection problems. Model 7c predicts whether there is a protest in a
year. The probability of protest is then included as a control variable in model 8c
predicting protest repression.

Appendix table 5c. Protest
repression controlling for
selection
Non-violent protest
Violent protest
Youth male unemployment
Political system = 1
Political system = 2
Democracy
Regular leader turnover
Irregular leader turnover
Physical integrity rights index
Probability of IMF exit
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)

Model 7c
Model 8c
Logistic regression Negative binomial regression
Protest onset
Protest repression
0.314***
(0.039)
0.339***
(0.076)
0.011*
(0.006)
0.010
(0.235)
-0.490***
(0.160)
0.072***
(0.013)
-0.302**
(0.146)
-0.190
(0.485)
-0.082*
(0.047)
0.039
(1.207)
0.228***
(0.055)
-0.041
(0.050)

Lagged DV
IMF compliance
184

-0.039*
(0.023)

2.446*
(1.265)
0.252***
(0.087)
-0.052
(0.086)
0.048**
(0.022)
0.974***

Civil war
Probability of protest
Constant

Observations
Number of countries

-3.133***
(0.997)
1,585
139
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

185

(0.363)
0.127
(0.227)
0.021
(0.054)
-5.258***
(1.608)
388
75

Appendix table 6c adds additional control variables. These variables include: leader
turnover (ARCHIGOS dataset), electoral system (Political Institutions Database),
independence of the judiciary and freedom of speech (CIRI dataset), and unemployment
(WDI). IMF compliance remains significant once again showing support for hypothesis
1.

Appendix table 6c. OLS with PCSE
Model 9c
Non-IMF controls
Physical integrity rights
IMF compliance

-0.660***
(0.192)
1.018
(0.646)
-0.049
(0.094)
-0.048
(0.331)
-0.269
(0.242)
0.470
(1.700)
0.145
(0.113)
0.153*
(0.081)
0.002
(0.022)
0.119
(0.701)
-0.066
(0.198)
0.048
(0.041)
0.057
(0.159)
3.849
(10.386)

Probability of IMF exit
Regular leader turnover
Irregular turnover
Assembly elected president
Presidential system
Independent judiciary
Freedom of speech
Unemployment
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Constant

Observations

452
186

Number of countries
77
R-squared
0.926
Fixed effects
YES
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

187

Appendix table 7c includes a number of IMF controls. These include the size of the loan,
the time under lending, and the type of loan. Even accounting for all of these IMF
specific factors IMF compliance still significantly decreases government respect for
physical integrity rights. Larger loans are also associated with increased repression.

Appendix 7c. OLS regression with PCSE
IMF controls

IMF compliance
Probability of IMF exit
IMF loan size
IMF years
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) loan
Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) loan
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan
Policy Support Instrument (PSI) loan
Standby Arrangement (SBA)
Standby Credit Facility (SCF) loan
Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Constant
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Model 10c
Physical integrity
rights
-0.729***
(0.188)
1.221*
(0.637)
-0.162***
(0.049)
0.035
(0.026)
0.092
(0.347)
1.079
(1.225)
-0.481
(1.005)
0.093
(0.162)
-0.276
(0.234)
-0.440
(0.330)
0.248
(0.365)
-0.551
(0.795)
-0.091
(0.207)
0.047
(0.038)
-0.005
(0.156)
15.508
(12.230)

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared
Fixed effects

462
79
0.928
YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 8c uses a mediation set up. Model 11c first predicts the probability of
violent protest. This model is taken from chapter 2. Violent protest is then included in
model 12c. IMF compliance increases violent protest. It also decreases government
respect for physical integrity rights. Violent protest similarly decreases respect for
physical integrity rights. This set up shows the causal pathway from IMF compliance to
dissent to repression.

Appendix table 8c. Mediation
model

Lagged DV
IMF compliance

Model 11c
Negative
binomial
regression
Violent protest

-0.012
(0.055)
1.085**
(0.515)

Violent protest
Probability of IMF exit
Total Population (logged)
GDP per capita (logged)
Democracy
IMF years
IMF years^2
IMF years^3
Protest repression
Non-violent protest
Constant

-0.516
(0.819)
0.369***
(0.099)
0.028
(0.104)
0.017
(0.027)
-0.692*
(0.355)
0.122**
(0.054)
-0.006**
(0.002)
0.022
(0.027)
-0.007
(0.023)
-6.218***
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Model 12c
OLS with PCSE

Physical integrity rights
index
0.153***
(0.057)
-0.587***
(0.224)
-0.063***
(0.018)
-2.543***
(0.740)
0.247
(0.900)
-0.158
(0.198)
0.018
(0.046)

2.158

Observations
R-squared
Number of countries
Fixed effects

(1.940)

(13.650)

414

393
0.821
77
YES

77
NO
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix table 9c disaggregates the Physical Integrity Index into its four components.
Torture, political imprisonment, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings take on three
values: 0 (mass violations), 1 (some violations), 2 (no violations). I collapse each of these
variables into a dichotomous measure since for many of them there are very few
instances of 2’s (no violations) and this causes problems with estimation. Model 15c and
16c show that as IMF compliance increases disappearances and extrajudicial killings get
worse. There is no effect on political imprisonment or torture. This once again support
hypothesis 1.

Appendix table 9c.
Logistic regression

Model 13c
Torture

Model 14c
Political
imprisonment

Model 15c
Disappearance

Model 16c
Extrajudicial
killing

Lagged DV

2.922***
(0.511)
-8.731***

2.953***
(0.640)
-4.739

4.312**
(1.702)
-11.130***

1.418
(1.657)
-3.044

(3.186)
-0.307
(0.701)
-0.130
(0.205)
0.273*
(0.159)
0.079**
(0.038)
-0.710
(0.516)
-0.849
(3.524)

(4.822)
-1.858
(1.313)
-0.521
(0.371)
-0.053
(0.326)
0.252***
(0.091)
-1.569***
(0.524)
9.641
(6.871)

(3.678)
-2.221*
(1.204)
-0.623
(0.459)
0.025
(0.313)
0.242**
(0.096)
0.712
(0.994)
11.113
(10.260)

(5.174)
-2.962*
(1.677)
-3.258**
(1.515)
0.163
(0.430)
-0.111
(0.160)
0.722
(0.780)
57.310**
(26.378)

Probability of IMF
exit
IMF compliance
Population (logged)
GDP per capita
(logged)
Democracy
Civil war
Constant

Observations
Number of countries

400
398
400
78
78
78
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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400
78

Conclusion
This project has explored the domestic consequences of compliance with IMF
austerity. The International Monetary Fund is a powerful International Organization that
controls hundreds of billions of dollars in funds. The IMF has a massive influence on the
global economy. Lending decisions and the conditions attached to loans have
significantly shaped domestic economic policy around the world in the post WWII era.
The IMF offers advice to all countries and acts a lender of last resort to countries facing
crisis. Unfortunately austerity conditions attached to IMF loans cause significant
hardships on borrower countries and may generate human rights violations and violence.
Chapter 2 explored how IMF austerity affects collective labor rights. Despite
increased collaboration between the IMF and the International Labour Organization
(ILO), 21st century program lending still generates labor rights violations. The IMF does
not incorporate labor rights or any other human rights protections into its conditionality.
Budget cuts, labor market flexibility, privatization and free trade reforms all work to put
downward pressure on labor rights and the ability of workers to organize collectively.
Despite the focus on pro-poor poverty, social welfare floors and domestic “ownership” of
conditionality, IMF lending seems to have changed little. By measuring and directly
testing the effect of compliance this chapter has shown evidence that rights violations are
caused by compliance with austerity reforms. This provides support for past studies on
the negative economic rights consequences of IMF program lending which have assumed

193

away compliance. The violation of labor rights as well as other economic rights often
leads to dissent and conflict and this relationship is discussed in chapter 3.
Chapter 3 showed how IMF programs generate grievances in society. IMF
austerity is argued to increase violations of economic and social rights. This is well
established in the literature and further evinced by the findings in chapter 2. These
violations push individuals into poverty, threaten their livelihood, and are popularly seen
as unfair. Austerity places the burden of reform on citizens rather than businesses,
investors, or the international community. These grievances erupt into violent protest as
compliance with program lending increases. Violence is large at the start of program
lending and declines in subsequent years. However, as the consequences of compliance
are felt and new loans are taken out violence re-emerges. Empirical tests find that
compliance increase violent protest and that violent protest is cyclically related to time
under IMF lending. Conflict and violence are two of the largest impediments to
development and the findings from this chapter suggest that the IMF undermines its own
cause by instigating violence in borrower countries. Violence is also associated with a
rise in repression, which is the topic of chapter 4.
Chapter 4 tied compliance with IMF conditionality to an increase in repression.
IMF lending generates increased violations of economic rights. These violations create
dissent within borrower communities where citizens and elites threaten leader security
through violent protest and coups. As threats to leaders increase repression also increases.
Austerity reforms also cut the salaries and benefits of police and the military who may
use repression to supplement their income or as an emotional response to grievances and
an increased workload. Budget cuts and the significant number of reforms require leaders
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to use their political capital to ensure compliance. This leaves them with fewer policy
tools to control dissent. Repression increases as alternative policy tolls (such as increased
spending) are taken off the table. Empirical models show that as compliance with IMF
austerity increases repression also increases.
This project has drawn a line from compliance with IMF austerity to labor rights
violations, collective violence, and repression. Pats work on IMF program participation
has looked at program lending in the 20th century. IMF arguments that program lending
in the 21st century are completely different from the past find little empirical support.
Instead the conclusions generated here show support for past research tying IMF
programs to economic rights violations, conflict, and repression. These previous studies
have been criticized for failing to measure compliance with IMF austerity. An alternative
explanation for these negative outcomes has blamed borrower countries which failed to
implement reforms and the IMF which failed to cut of lending.
The major contribution of this work has been to move this debate forward.
Compliance was directly measured and used to test these relationships. There may be
institutional aspect of the IMF as an International Organization that cause negative
outcomes. Borrower governments are likely also culpable. However, the arguments
presented here and empirical support for these arguments suggest that IMF austerity is to
blame for declining human rights respect and increase societal violence. If countries
implemented a larger percent of IMF conditionality we would see more labor rights
violations, more conflict, and more repression from borrower countries. Austerity appears
to be incompatible with human rights and domestic peace.
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Human rights violations and conflict are widely agreed to impede economic
development. The results found here provide one explanation for why IMF borrowers
have seen disappointing levels of growth. By generating human rights violations and
violence the IMF undermines its own economic recovery efforts. In any given year,
between one fifth and one third of countries in the world are under IMF program lending.
Human rights conscious reforms to IMF program lending could significantly improve
human rights around the globe and help reduce domestic violence.
This research has also generated a number of policy recommendations. The
research tying IMF programs to human rights violations and violence has been going on
for decades. It is long past time for the IMF as an International Organization that is part
of the United Nations system to address these violations. Violations of human rights
during IMF program participation need to be punished. Loans should be cut off when
human rights are violated in order to comply with reforms. International Organizations
tasked with protecting human rights and promoting peace should also take a more active
role in collaborating and providing technical assistance to the IMF. Mission creep has left
the IMF either unable or unwilling to design conditionality in ways that do not violate
international human rights law.
The IMF should re-evaluate the policies attached to program lending. If austerity
is incompatible with human rights as this research suggests then the IMF should adopt a
different reform model. Stimulus spending needs to be re-examined in the context of
economic rights. At the very least budget requirements should require funding for
education, healthcare, government employment, and social welfare spending remains
intact. Conditionality could improve monitoring of human rights, suggest ratification of
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international human rights agreements, and punishment of state agents which violate
these rights. Lending agreements already incorporate anti-corruption measures and it
seems a natural next step to include human rights measures as well.
Powerful member countries which fund and influence IMF lending decisions need
to take an active role in promoting these reforms. The European Union and the United
States have historically been the biggest advocates of human rights protections. In the 21 st
century mass atrocities are on the rise and the human rights regime remains vulnerable.
The rise of far-right parties, xenophobia, hate groups, and attacks on refugees make the
protection of human rights more important than ever. The US and EU as the largest
funders of the IMF could help address these issues globally by forcing the IMF to take a
more active role in protecting human rights.
Although this research has pushed the envelope there are many questions that
remain unanswered. Do these findings translate to other types of labor rights? How do
IMF programs affect the informal economy and individual labor rights? The compliance
data presented here allows researchers to re-examine other types of economic and social
rights. If these findings are also corroborated it would be the nail in the coffin for IMF
efforts to shirk their responsibility for human rights violations.
A natural extension of chapter 2 would be to explore how compliance and time
under IMF lending affect other types of dissent including: elections, leader survival, nonviolent protest, terrorism, civil conflict, strikes, and riots. Dissent can take many forms
and the findings here tell us nothing about these other types of dissent. It is also possible
that IMF compliance leads to escalations in conflict: from non-violent to violent protest,
and from violent protest to rebellion. Does conflict spread from IMF borrowers to non-
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IMF borrowers? Does it spread from neighboring IMF borrowers in similar ways as civil
conflict. Future work should also examine in more detail how IMF compliance affect the
repression-dissent nexis.
Chapter 3 explores physical integrity rights but there are many other forms that
repression can take. Does IMF conditionality increase preventive repression whereby
borrower governments expel journalists, round up labor leaders and activists, or create
curfews and restrictions on freedom of association or movement? Do leaders repress preemptively in anticipation of violent protest; attempting to quash dissent before it
happens? How do IMF programs affect the ability to cover up repression? For example it
may be that conditions meant to increase transparency make it harder for leaders to get
away with repression. It may also be that activists and human rights organizations pay
more attention to human rights violations under IMF lending given popular beliefs about
the IMF. In this sense IMF programs may shine a light on violations.
All three of these chapters have chosen to use other IMF borrowers as the
comparison groups. Compliance has varied among borrowers and been used to explain
differences in human rights and violence while holding other differences constant. Yet
this says nothing about whether IMF borrowers see higher levels of violations that nonborrowers. Although the scholarly literature has shown this to be true, exploring these
relationships with compliance could lead to fascinating research. The findings presented
here may also vary by regime type, electoral system, region, and income. While these
variables were held constant in this project they should be examined in their own right.
What happens when countries exit IMF lending and undergo World Bank lending? What
explains variation in compliance with IMF austerity? Is it domestic politics, state
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capacity, human rights obligations, civil society objections, or some other considerations?
The compliance measure introduced here can be used to test may of the theories in the
IMF compliance literature. Which policies are generating these negative outcomes? What
other aspects of IMF lending can help us unpack these relationships?
This project sees compliance as a first step in unpacking the black box of austerity
and my hope is that future researchers will build upon this work to answer the plethora of
questions that remain. It is also my hope that these findings might have a broader impact
on policy and debates concerning economic reforms and human rights. International
Organizations will continue to play a large role in global politics. Unless they re-examine
the consequences of their actions they have the potential to undermine political stability
and the human rights regime. The IMF has been shown to do just this. There is far too
much evidence at this point for researchers and the policy community to continue
ignoring the consequences of austerity. If the 21 st century hopes to see the protection of
human rights and declines in violence then austerity as a reform strategy needs to be
abandoned or significantly reformed.
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